

Andalas Discussion on International Studies: Multidimensional Issues and Approaches



**Edited by
Sofia Trisni & Ardila Putri**

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Andalas Institute of International Studies

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PREFACE

Andalas Discussion on International Studies: Multidimensional Issues and Approaches

International relations studies have been developing in terms of issues and perspectives. Nevertheless, its scientific roots which were born out of a desire to prevent war and create peace still remain the spirit of the studies. Besides discussing war and conflict, international relations studies also talk about various issues related to global finance, humanitarian assistance, tourism, diaspora and other non-traditional security issues. These various issues also frame the discussion in international relations today, including other aspects that have contributed to discourse related to this field.

Nowadays, discussion about conflicts still attracts people's concern. From the early stage of human history until the creation of the modern state system, conflict is still an important issue to analyze because of the intensity of its events that continues to exist. The analysis of threats, remains an important topic to be discussed, while the existence of China as a country that is considered a rising power in international politics is the hottest discourse to talk about. In addition, problems in the Middle East that have not yet found a way out have resulted in various analysis regarding the most appropriate solution to resolve conflicts in the region.

This book is a collection of various issues in international relations studies. The authors analyze them using many different methods. As stated by Hariyadi Wirawan in the book of *Reflection on International Relations Theory from Traditional to Contemporary Issues*, international relations is a complex object to be analyzed using only one perspective. Inspired by this statement, this book seeks to show diversity in the study of cross-border relations. Through this diversity, we hope that readers can have wide perspective in analyzing the issue of international relations. Thus, it can be seen as the studies which are able to answer various modern problems. Furthermore, this book is suitable for international relations scholars, both for practitioners and academics, who are interested in getting various insights on how international relations studies analyzing various phenomena. This book is written by lecturers of international relations department based on their area of expertise.

In the first chapter, this book presents the phenomenon of countries surviving from the effects of global crisis amid the fall of major powers. The author, Sofia Trisni, presents the global financial crisis phenomenon that hit the world in 2007 and how a country like China was able to survive from this crisis. Globalization brings close relations between one country and another and the intensity of this relationship provides an opportunity for all banks in the world to connect with each other. Therefore, the crisis that struck one country in a moment can spread to other countries. Remarkably, China managed to survive this crisis, even though the United States as the major cause of the crisis is one of China's biggest trading partners. This chapter shows data on the Chinese economy in the initial quarter of the crisis and also China's ability to withstand the crisis. By using literature study, Trisni argues that there are various factors that help China in surviving the crisis, including the period of crisis that occurred right after China made improvements to its banks. There are various other factors outlined by bringing up some supporting facts. This paper provides an illustration of how globalization has increased world connections in such a way that crisis originating from one country can spread to various countries and turn a local crisis into a global one. Nevertheless, the country can still survive the crisis as China has shown.

The author of the second chapter is Anita Afriani Sinulingga with a writing titled International Humanitarian Aid and State Policy. It describes the state's dilemma in receiving humanitarian assistance because of political motives that are often superimposed through the process. This chapter analyzes the phenomenon of providing humanitarian assistance by using the concept of state behavior and social capital in disaster management. This concept provides an overview of the usual role played by the state in relation to disasters and dimensions in social capital. In this chapter, Sinulingga argues that providing humanitarian assistance is a difficult phenomenon to avoid today, thus, it requires a rapid response from the state by issuing disaster management policies that will protect the country from political purposes "entrusted" in humanitarian assistance. This study illustrates that the issue in international relations today has evolved towards non-traditional issues.

The third chapter is collaboration of two authors, Haiyyu Darman Moenir and Abdul Halim, titled The Implementation of the ASEAN Tourism Strategic Plan (ATSP) in Indonesia's Marine Tourism Policy. This chapter discusses how the ASEAN strategic plan related to tourism

is implemented through Indonesia's marine tourism policy, considering that President Jokowi himself has a strong attention on the maritime potential of Indonesia. This chapter finds that there are several Indonesian marine tourism policies plans that have been prepared by ASEAN. This paper enriches perspectives in international studies by presenting how tourism issues can be discussed within international relations framework.

In the fourth chapter, Rika Isnarti presents a discussion of a threat by using the concept of political threats rooted in the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School. This chapter begins by describing the understanding of threats explained by the mainstream theory of Realism, before explaining this shift in understanding through definitions offered by the Copenhagen School. This paper provides another perspective on why threats can arise. Isnarti argues that a threat is created through a social construction. It is related to how actors examine particular issue and digest it based on the understanding they have gained in their social life.

The fifth chapter titled Overview of Indonesian Students in Taiwan and Indonesia - Taiwan Cooperation on Education looks at the phenomenon of citizens diplomacy in relation to foreign governments. The author, Ardila Putri, presents actions initiated by Indonesian students who are studying in Taiwan, related to the educational activities they are currently undertaking. The article begins with an explanation of the agreements that have been held by Indonesia and Taiwan, and how these agreements were implemented. As the result, the Taiwanese government has succeeded in increasing the number of Indonesian students studying in Taiwan.

The following chapter presents a discussion on China titled Central Asia Security Implications to Xinjiang. The author, Inda Mustika Permata, argues that there are complex security problems in central Asia, thus, this chapter uses the concept of security complex in analyzing various security phenomena occurring in the region. This chapter focuses on Xinjiang, a region which is geographically and juridically part of China, but has sought to become an independent country. Given the enormous potential possessed by Xinjiang, China seeks to continue maintaining sovereignty over the region by securitizing several activities that take place in Xinjiang. It is interesting to see the efforts of a large socialist country like China in maintaining its sovereignty.

The following writing takes the readers to the Middle East, where the conflict is still happening. With the title *Is Participation of Israeli Women in the Peace Process Potentially Solving the War Between Israel and Palestine?*, Maryam Jamilah tried to question whether the involvement of women in the peace process between Israel and Palestine could produce more positive results. By looking at philosophical theories which suggest two contradictory matters regarding women involvement in the peace process, Jamilah invites us to analyze possibilities that can be generated through the involvement of women. At the end of her analysis, Jamilah argues that women involvement in the peace process is indeed very potential to help achieving peace between Israel and Palestine.

The book closes with an article titled *Civil Society, Global Governance, and Political Representation* by Rifki Dermawan. In this chapter, Dermawan tries to raise the discussion about the power of civil societies as their participation in global governance increases. This phenomenon of globalization which we cannot avoid has become a medium that provides an opportunity for civil societies to make contribution at the global level. Unfortunately, political participation is still challenging for them. Dermawan presents various ideas and frameworks used in civil society to understand political participation. In this chapter, the readers will get new insights related to civil society, global governance and political participation in globalization era.

As stated at the beginning of this Preface, this book presents the diversity of issues and perspectives in international relations studies. We hope that the readers will have broad views on international relations which are not merely discussing war and peace. We are fully aware that the book is far from perfect, therefore, we are open to criticism and suggestions for future improvement. We are waiting for feedback from the readers via email to our publisher. Happy reading.

Padang, October 2019

Editors,

Sofia Trisni and Ardila Putri

HOW DID CHINA RESILIENCE THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS?

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Abstract

The Global Financial crisis that hit the world in 2007 affected many big countries in the world. Amazingly, China able to manage itself to spare from the enormous effect of this financial crisis. Consider the globalization that connects one country to another, China resilience to this crisis is an outstanding phenomenon. This article tries to discuss China's formula to survive the crisis. This article found some factors of the resilience such as; China's large population and people saving the culture, its diversified economy, the timing of the crisis, government's appropriate policy and China's strategic geography. All factors were the supporting condition for China to overcome the crisis

Keywords

Global Financial Crisis; China; Resilience

INTRODUCTION

The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) began in mid-2007 as a result of the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States, which spread to the rest of the world in 2008 resulting in a significant downturn in the world's economic growth from 3.1 % in 2008 to -1.4 % in 2009 (Mah-Hui and L. Chin, 2010). Although mainly starting in the West, the crisis affected the global economy greatly, since the Western countries affected were the major wheels of world economic growth. Moreover, in the era of globalization banks are heavily linked to one another, resulting in the crisis spreading easily (Mah-Hui and L. Chin, 2010), where banks in China also inevitable to this phenomenon.

China's recent history is a story of amazing growth, with an average GDP growth rate of 10 percent in the last two decades (Sullivan, 2013) however, it was also affected by this crisis. But even though Chinese economic growth experienced quite a significant decline from 11.4 percent growth in 2007 to 9.1 percent in 2009, it managed to control its economy from further decline; it even managed to take over Japan's position as world second largest economy in 2010 (Sullivan, 2013).

This article aims to study China's policy in order to survive from the GFC. For that reason, this article divided into two parts. The first part examines China's economic situation before the GFC and performance during the GFC. While the second part analyses how China fared so well through the GFC; it looks into government policy and looks into China's Geo-economic position. It is the contention of this article that China resilience the GFC because of the appropriate and quick economic stimulus package from the central government and

because of China's Geo-economic position that lies within the growth area of East Asia and its government intelligence to utilize this situation. However, China will still have to adjust its economic policies for future economic sustainability.

ECONOMIC SITUATION BEFORE AND DURING THE GFC

China's recent economic growth has been amazing, with it maintain double-digit for six years in a row since 2003 (Morisson , 2012) until the third quarter of 2008. During this period, China was able to maintain impressive growth figures. A remarkable achievement; within 2007 China replacing the United States (US) as the world's second largest merchandise exporter after the European Union (EU), with China's net exports as a one-third source of its GDP (Morisson , 2009). This achievement has increased the significance of exports to China's GDP.

Overall, China's economy relies heavily on trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) (Liu, 2009). Chinese exports of goods and services in 2008 constituted 37.8 percent of its total GDP, while China received a total of US\$ 75 billion in the form of FDI, which seated it as the world's third largest receiver of FDI after the EU and US (Morrison, 2009). However, as the crisis hit, China's FDI inflow declined to US\$ 20 billion (Yongding, 2010), a significant reduction. The slowdown of demand from its trading partners had declined its exports dramatically as well as its imports (Schuller and Schuler-Zhou, 2009). One example of industries that faced a significant decline in exports in China is the steel industry which experienced as much as a 54% drop (Yongding, 2010) in regard to the decrease of demand from its trading partners.

The economic slowdown experienced by the EU, the US and Japan also had a further negative impact on China's economy as China sells nearly 50 percent of its exported goods to them (Liu, 2009); the EU, the US, and Japan's economic downturns led to a decline in demand for Chinese goods, which ultimately decreases the number of China's exports. Then, there is an indirect link that makes the EU, the US and Japan import to China's economy: through FDI. Even though China only receives 12 percent of its total FDI from them, 44 percent of its FDI comes from Hong Kong, which relies on the EU, the US, and Japan (Liu, 2009). That is why the impact of the crisis experienced by the US, EU, and Japan also influenced China's economy.

Further, the table below gives an overview of the GFC impact on China's economy:

Table of China's quarterly economic growth 2004-2009

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Quarter 1	9.7 %	10.5%	10.8%	11.1%	10.6%	6.1%
Quarter 2	9.7%	10.5%	11.4%	11.5%	10.1%	7.9%
Quarter 3	9.5%	10.4%	11.2%	11.5%	9.0%	
Quarter 4	9.5%	10.4%	11 %	11.5%	6.8 %	

Source: M. Yang and MH, Siam-Heng, *Global Financial Crisis and Challenges for China*, World Scientific, 2012, p.8.

This table shows that China was experiencing good growth when the crisis hit. It just reached the peak of economic growth with an average of 11.4 % in 2007 before the effect of crisis finally impacted the country's economy and slowed growth. Starting from the first quarter of 2008; China's economy experienced the downturn and reach its bottom in the first quarter of 2009 when it experienced 6.1% growth, the lowest rate of growth in the last four years.

One of the factors in the decline of China's economic growth was a significant decline in exports. China's exports begin to decline at the beginning of 2008, from 30% in March 2008 to approximately 19% in June 2009 (Yang and Siam-Heng, 2012). In line with that, some Chinese factories collapsed and increased unemployment numbers (Schmidt, 2009). As an illustration, there were 20 million migrant workers that lost their jobs during 2008, which contributed to the increasing the Chinese unemployment rate to 4.6% in 2009, the highest rate since the 1980s (Yang and Siam-Heng, 2012). Overall, China's GDP growth decreased from 9% in the third quarter of 2008 to 6.1 % in the first quarter of 2009 (Yang and Siam-Heng, 2012). These figures show that China was not resistant to the GFC as China also experienced an economic downturn.

However, there are some factors that made China fair relatively better than Western economies; that is its huge population and its relatively diversified economy. Apart from exports and FDI, Chinese economic growth also owed its success to domestic demand. Its large population and therefore consumer base is also a source of its healthy growth. When the crisis hit, its exports and FDI were affected badly.

However, its big domestic demand and fixed asset investment have helped the country to survive from a radical downturn (Yang and Siam-Heng, 2012). China's huge population have helped to maintain the high rate of domestic demand, so even though its export and FDI were disturbed, domestic demand remained an important factor of Chinese resistance to the recession.

Moreover, when the crisis struck, China just finished the examination of its banking system by "writing off non-performing loans and providing large-scale capital injections" (Yongding, 2010). Thus, China's banks were relatively healthy when the Western banking system collapsed during the crisis (Yongding, 2010). In addition, China has a high saving rate of 26 % of total disposable income; considerably higher than the saving rates of most develop economies, and its well-capitalized bank having total net cash of US\$ 272 billion, which is nearly 55% present of total net cash of all top ten companies in the world (Yang and Siam-Heng, 2012). Along with that, China's public debt declined from 30% of total GDP in 2003 to 18 % of total GDP in 2007 (Yang and Siam-Heng, 2012). So the banks still managed to work to fight the financial storm because they were in prime conditions when the crisis came.

What is more, China also has a strong fiscal record; from 2000 to 2007 its fiscal balance increased from a deficit of nearly 3% of the GDP to a surplus of 0.7% of GDP and its public debt declined from 30% of total GDP in 2003 to 18 % of total GDP in 2007 (Yang and Siam-Heng, 2012). If the GFC is assumed as a virus, the virus attacked when China's body was in its very good condition, so that the body was able to

overcome the virus. The next part of the article will examine what policies China pursued during the GFC.

HOW DID CHINA RESILIENCE?

The first part of the article has explored the Chinese economy before the GFC and the impact upon it during the GFC. This next part looks at both the policy conducted by the Chinese government to fight the GFC and provide an argument for why China's Geo-economic position and the government's intelligence were important factors that contributed to the success of China to survive during the crisis.

This article argues that the first reason for China's survival during the GFC was the quick reaction by the government to deliver the economic stimulus package due to its centrality system. When the impact of GFC affected its economy in the third quarter of 2008, the central government responded by providing a US\$586 billion stimulus on 9 November 2008 (Overhorlt, 2010). This reaction was very quick if we compare with the US; the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act was only approved by Congress in mid-February 2009 (Lardy, 2012). The political system in the U.S. to make long runs and the approval process takes longer time compared to the centrality system in China.

Further, the stimulus also took into account which sectors provide the biggest contribution to China's economic growth. The government provided stimulus to those sectors which affect the economy most, which by stimulating them, kept the economy growing. An example of this from China's huge stimulus plan is that approximately 45% of total stimulus was planned to use for transportation networks (Liu, 2009), with goals to widen its

infrastructure and support domestic consumption and job creation (Schuller and Schuler-Zhou, 2009). This area was chosen as the biggest area that received stimulus because fixed asset investment has long been the most important component of China's growth (Yongding, 2010). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that "fixed investment related to tradable goods plus net export together accounted for over 60 percent of China's GDP growth from 2001 to 2008 (up from 40 percent from 1990 to 2000)" (Morisson, 2009). This percentage was higher compare to G-7 countries (16%), the Euro area (30%) and the rest of Asia with 30 % (Morisson, 2009). Maintaining the viability of fixed asset investment, which is an important factor for China's economy, meant the government was protected the economy from further losses. Moreover, as much as 9 % was allocated in rural infrastructure to boost the rural economy (Liu, 2009). Apart from that, the government also announced 10 pillars to be the focus of the stimulus: industries such as autos, steel, shipbuilding, textiles, machinery, electronics and information, light industry (such as customer products), petrochemicals, non-ferrous metals, and logistics (Morisson, 2009).


In addition, as exports are also considered as an important sector, the stimulus package program also provided a tax rebate for exporters to 15 percent of central government expenditure in order to protect its exports from significant collapse (Yongding, 2010). By that, we can conclude that with this stimulus program, the government aimed to assist the sectors which were identified as significant to China's economic growth.

Further, this stimulus was conducted by taking into account the elements that can support economic success. For example, to maintain the effectiveness of this stimulus, it was given to old state enterprises that could create job quickly and assumed could afford to pay the loan back (Overhorlt, 2010). By doing this, the government reduced the number of unemployment and also prevented itself from bankruptcy from unpaid loans. Along with that, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) issued new regulations about easing the establishment process of companies that could provide consumer loans to private households for the purchase of consumer durable (Schuller and Schuler-Zhou,2009). The government also appointed four major state-owned banks to increase loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Schuller and Schuler-Zhou, 2009). That is, the government does not only give money but also provide easiness for companies that could reduce unemployment in the country. This strategy killed two birds with one stone, providing benefits to both the government and the people. Moreover, the government also guided the effectiveness of this program by appointing some trusted institutions to execute the package. Nevertheless, China would not have been able to provide a large stimulus package if its economy had been in a worse state. When the GFC hit, China's economy was in a prime position. This condition made the Chinese able to allocate substantial funds for the stimulus to fight the GFC. So, the stimulus package was made possible because of economic conditions that allowed for the release of large amounts of stimulus.

As a result of the stimulus package, China became the first country in the world to recover from the economic recession, an

impressive feat (Lardy, 2012). In early 2009, China's fixed asset investment enhanced as much as 32.9 percent (Yongding, 2010); state-owned and state-controlled enterprises increased as much as 40.6 percent and investment by non-state enterprises growth amounted to 23.5 percent (Schuller and Schuler-Zhou, 2009). An improvement also can be seen in industrial production where production increased 8.9 percent from 2008, while retail sales growth amounted 15.2 percent (Yongding, 2010). The table below shows China's economic growth after the GFC:

Table of China's Economic Growth 2009-2012



Source: <http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/12/news/economy/china-gdp/>

As a whole, China's economic growth in 2009 shows a gradual increase, from 6.1 percent in the first quarter of 2009 to 10.7 percent in the final quarter of 2009 which makes China's average growth in 2009 8.4 percent. This percentage is actually still lower compared to that of 2008 that was 9.1 percent, however, China's average growth in 2010 was 10.4 percent, which was higher than in 2008. Besides, economic growth per quarter, after the third quarter of 2009 recorded a rate above

8 percent, in contrast with the figures during the crisis, which were only about 6 percent.

From the data provided above, it can be concluded that China's stimulus programs managed to fight the recession. Key sectors that were affected by the recession managed to show improvement. Nevertheless, even though the stimulus package has shown its success, some experts are still in doubt whether this program could sustain China's economic growth over the long term. For example, the large amount of stimulus in the infrastructure sector may have a potential risk that it leads to a bubble in property prices that might hinder economic sustainability (Zhang, 2009). As evident, the housing prices in some coastal area have increased by 40 % on average (Zhang, 2009). Apart from that, China has to expand its private sector, otherwise, it might face an employment crisis; the recent crisis has shown that China's SMEs were vulnerable to any shock (Schuller and Schuler-Zhou,2009). Factors that influence this vulnerability are their weak export performance. A survey conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) involving 70 SMEs in the coastal provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Fujian showed that ninety percent of these SMEs experienced such a decline in orders from the US and Europe that as much as 40 percent of them decided to close their business and/or considered closing (Schuller and Schuler-Zhou,2009). This fact shows that Chinese exports are still immature and could threaten the future of China's growth.

Another factor to be considered by the Chinese government is domestic consumption. The problem of low export figures due to low demand from trading partners inevitably will require increasing

domestic consumption. The increasing household consumption at least could sustain the low number of export volume. However, the government stimulus for this sector is very limited (Zhang, 2009), so it might be said that the government tends to put less attention to this sector.

As a comparison, household consumption in China only amounts to 34 percent of its GDP, while in the US, the percentage amount of household consumption to GDP is 70 percent, Japan 58 percent, the EU 57 percent, and India 54 percent (International Economy, 2010). These figures show that China as a rapidly developing country seems to pay less attention to the country's household consumption, while this is actually an important element of long-term economic sustainability.

China should immediately solve the new problem that comes because of the impact of this stimulus; otherwise, it would be difficult for China to achieve sustainable economic growth into the future.

This section has described the Chinese government's stimulus package; its goals and its results. It can be said that China managed to survive the GFC because of the government's appropriate strategy to sustain the economy during the crisis; it chose appropriate sectors to be stimulated. The Chinese government as described above chose to stimulate the economy by financing the sectors that demand a lot of labor so that the problem of unemployment can be addressed and the public finally have funds for their consumption. China's stimulus programs focus on increasing government expenditure. This is in contrast for example to the measures taken by the US government that allocating one-third of the total stimulus to tax cuts in order to increase people's income; in China, the government cut the tax on some durable

goods, so in order to get the benefit of that tax cut, people need to buy, which mean increasing the expenditure (Lardy, 2012) allowing money to circulate and stimulate the economy. In central, the main issue is not only in the liquidating of the stimulus, but relied heavily on government strategy in choosing the appropriate sector to be stimulated.

Apart from government's quick reaction in providing stimulus to the right sectors, this article also argues that another factor that contributed to the resilience of China to the GFC is its Geo-economic location in the centre of Asia and the prudence of the Chinese government to accurately use the situation. This article argues that China benefited greatly from its Geo-economic location in the heart of Asia. This allowed the Chinese government to become the largest trading partner of the growing countries of Asia, which aided China's resilience to the GFC.

China is in a growth environment; the combination of economic growth in the nine largest economic in East Asia: China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand reached 9 percent in 2007, before declining slightly to 8.5 percent in the first quarter of 2008 (ADB, 2008) which shows the rapid development of some Asian countries. Further, Asia does not only include these nine countries alone, but India also recorded significant economic progress. In 2009, India became the fourth largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) (Lam and Wei, 2009). China is located in a growth area, a Geo-economic region supporting its economic growth.

An example of this is the corporation between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) which includes five

of the 9 largest emerging East Asian countries economies such as Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Both China and ASEAN have agreed to enhance regional economic cooperation to a higher level by implementing the ACFTA (ASEAN-China Free Trade Area).

The ACFTA agreement reflects the commitment of China and six ASEAN members including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Brunei Darussalam to enter the FTA effective from January 2010, with the less developed members: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam adhering to the agreement from 2015 onwards (Cordenilo, 2012). Starting from January 2010, ACFTA became one of the largest free trade areas in the world in term of population. It covers 1.9 billion people, with a total combined GDP amounting to US\$ 6.6 trillion and total trade amounting to \$US 4.3 trillion (Thangavelu, 2012). This agreement covers a huge number of people, enabling China to access a huge consumer base, which is important for Chinese exports.


Statistics show that when the effects of the GFC started to hit Asia in late 2008, there was an increase IN trade between China and ASEAN. This increase was likely due to China's effort to minimize the impact of the crisis brought about by declining demand in other trading partners such as the US and EU and Japan. This increasing trade was chronicled by ASEAN, the association revealed that since 2009, China has become ASEAN's largest trading partner. Trade between China and ASEAN increased by 20.9 percent from US\$ 232 billion in 2010 to US\$ 280.4 billion in 2011. Further, ASEAN's exports to China in 2011 were increased by 28.9 percent from the previous year to US\$

145.7 billion. Moreover, imports from China rose by 13.2 percent with the value of US\$ 134.7 billion. This increasing trade volume has placed ASEAN as China's third largest trading partner, increased from rank four in the previous year. On top of this, a sign of China's foreign direct investment went into ASEAN, seeing it increase as much as 117 percent, from US\$ 2.7 billion in 2010 to US\$ 5.9 billion in 2011 (ASEAN, 2013).

China is located in a growing environment so that when the GFC hit, it was relatively easy for China to find a way to diversify its trading partner in contrast if it had relied only on its traditional partners (the US, EU, and Japan) it would have fared much worse. China's efforts can be seen from its willingness to increase the volume of trade with its ASEAN counterparts, and thus the impact of the crisis could be minimized.

Apart from ASEAN, China also has close trade ties with India, the country with the second highest economic growth in Asia after China; China and India are the two largest developing countries in the world (Tian and Yu, 2012). China and India started their economic relationship in 1978 and the highest record of trade was noted in 2008 (Embassy of India, 2012). Moreover, the intensity of China – India trade relations could be seen from this figure:

Table of China – India sharing trade 1992—2009



Source: Data from IMF 2010

Source: <http://www.thkunuz.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/china-india-trade-share-1992-20092.jpg>

The figure above shows that China has a big export to India's market. It can be seen that China has big trading volume with Asia's new emerging country as a source of power to fight the crisis. Moreover, according to India's government official website, since 2008, China is India's largest trading partner in goods, replacing the US. China and India's trade value reached US\$ 51.8 billion in 2008, and although this figure declined by 16.6 percent by the end of 2009, as a result of the GFC to US\$ 43.27 billion, the trade in 2010 reached US\$ 61.74 billion or rose as much as 43 percent compared to the previous year (Embassy of India, 2013).

As mentioned previously, China is India's largest trading partner while India is China's 15th largest trading partner. This position provides an indication that in two places, India and ASEAN as growing countries, China managed to become their number one trading partner. That is, both places with a high population are the market of China's

product or China's export's area. When the question of why China relatively strong against economic shocks in 2008 arise, one should look to how China has managed to become the number one trading partner of Asia's new emerging economies, which allow China to maintain its income from exports. Thus, strengthening the economic relations with these countries allows China to fight the crisis.

CONCLUSION

This article has identified China's effective policies during the recession and also describes the benefit of China's geographical location and its government ability to enhance China's trade.

Overall, China was experiencing a very impressive rate of economic growth when the crisis that originating from the US began to infect the global economy. As an economy reliant on exports, the decrease in demand from its major trading partners posed a threat to China's economy. Not only that, but the recession also reduced the flow of FDI into China, which is also a crucial component in China's economy. However, China has managed to become the first major economy in the world to overcome the crisis. The Chinese government's successful handling of this crisis was partly because of the agility and speed of the government for liquidating the stimulus. It can be said here that the Chinese are benefited from its highly centralized political model. But not only that, but the government also made accurate judgments in determining which sectors should be given economic stimulus. In addition, China has managed to resilience the crisis because of its huge population that allows the country to have huge domestic demand (Yang and Siam-Heng, 2012).

However, China needs to adjust its economy over the long run. The current economic systems do not seem sustainable, which require the government to adjust broader economy policy such as China's over reliance on fixed investment and export for its economic growth (Morrison, 2009).

Apart from the above prime reason, China's ability to survive the GFC is also because of the government's effort in strengthening China's economic ties with new emerging economies. China has strengthened its economic relations with some strategic countries in the region, such as the ASEAN states and India. ASEAN and India are two economies with rapid growth and China has managed to become the number one trading partner for both of them. This means that China has managed to gain a very large market share of their domestic markets, given the very huge population of ASEAN and India. China's success in becoming the main trading partners for those countries was able to boost China's economy that was shaken due to reduced demand from the US, EU, and Japan.

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INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID AND STATE POLICY

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Abstract

This paper is a review of various literature sources aimed at explaining state behavior towards international humanitarian aid. International humanitarian aid is always in a dilemma between the side of altruism and the political side. Donor countries implement a policy of refusing foreign aid on the grounds that humanitarian aid is no longer neutral to deal with the catastrophic crisis but shifts to politically charged motives such as humanitarian intervention. Through the exploration of humanitarian aid cases experienced by various disaster-affected countries, this paper intends to provide a lesson for Indonesia in establishing foreign policy, especially those related to humanitarian aid from international donors. State behavioral framework and Social Capital concept are operationalized in the discussion section. This paper finds that state behavior, whether in the form of acceptance or rejection, of international humanitarian aid is strongly influenced by the capability factor of social capital owned by the donor recipient country.

Keywords

humanitarian assistance; state behavior; social capital

INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, the word “disaster” has provided opportunities for many actors, both state and non-state to take a part and play a specific role in international community. This implicates in various forms of shifts, changes, intersections and adaptations of each actor’s interests. Natural disaster is a certainty in Indonesia. As a disaster-prone country, Indonesia has the potential of 13 types of disasters, such as geological, hydrometeorological, biological, social or man-made disaster (Law No. 24 of 2007). These conditions and the experiences of the Indonesian government in handling disasters named Indonesia as the World Disaster Laboratory. In the global political arena, the Indonesian government places disaster as soft power to improve the nations’ competitiveness and can be used as social motivation to build productive international cooperation (Maarif, 2012; Herningtyas, 2014). On the other hand, humanitarian aid often does not require the preconditions of diplomatic relations between countries. This happened when Indonesia distributed humanitarian aid to victims of the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the typhoon Nargis disaster in Myanmar (2008), major flooding in Pakistan (2009), earthquake and tsunami in Japan (2011), large floods in Australia (2011) and earthquakes in New Zealand (2011). Indonesia, in this case, has made changes related to the issue of disasters where Indonesia is currently not only a recipient of aid, but also becomes a donor country.

An important note in the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami disaster in Aceh was the government's rapid response in mobilizing global solidarity through providing opportunities for state and non-state actors who wanted to distribute humanitarian aid. At that time,

Aceh was open to all vehicles carrying logistical assistance from abroad. The policy similarly applied to military and international NGOs working for international humanitarian missions. In its development, the Indonesian government has changed its perspective of international humanitarian assistance on disaster issues. Previously, the Indonesian government implemented the Open Door Policy for foreign aid to anticipate and mitigate disaster risk, currently regulated through the One Door Policy. One of the fundamental differences of this policy is that, in the past, foreign aid could be delivered by donor agencies to victims of disasters through NGOs or directly submitted to local governments. Today, foreign aid must go through the BNPB as a focal point of Indonesian disaster management. In the past, international donor agencies were more flexible and could directly provide assistance to local NGOs and communities, while today these international institutions must adjust to the disaster management policy implemented by the government, which tends to be more selective. In the series of disaster management regulations, international donor agencies have limited participation in the emergency response period. They have to go directly to the disaster site, after being granted permission by the Indonesian government. The current policy does not signify Indonesia closing itself to foreign aid; however, it presents a more selective strategy in accepting international assistance. Such policy changes might lead to various responses from donor institutions, both positive and negative. This paper attempts to explain the state's behavior towards international humanitarian assistance.

COUNTRY POLICY PRACTICES ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Natural disasters become political characteristics when they enter the domain of policymaking. As a disaster-prone country, policy related to disaster management is a necessity to Indonesia, especially ones pertaining to the selective acceptance of natural disaster humanitarian assistance, such as the concern of this paper. This paper is based on the perspective of the state as the main actor in international relations which has sovereignty both within the inward and outward aspect. State governments in disaster-prone areas are often faced with policy-making dilemmas to respond to sudden disasters. The international response which also appears simultaneously to provide humanitarian assistance needs to be responded with the correct policy to guarantee humanitarian assistance achieving its target and does not erode sovereignty of the affected country. Some humanitarian aid could be received by the affected countries and only few of them could immediately receive disaster assistance.

The following are some cases of international humanitarian assistance refusal from disaster-affected countries. The Iranian government firmly rejected assistance from the United States in the disaster of the 2005 earthquake, while at the same time, Iran was willing to accept assistance from Japan, China, Australia, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates and several international organizations. In another case, in 1998, Cuba experienced logistical and financial difficulties. There were humanitarian assistance offers from outside Cuba, including from the United States. However, the US bid was rejected by Fidel Castro's government because of the diplomatic relations history between the two

countries which were more strained rather than cooperative. Cuba was concerned that this assistance would provide a bargaining position for the US to receive Cuban political concession in the future (HPG Briefing, 2002).

Rejection of international humanitarian assistance also happened during the Nargis hurricane in Myanmar. The Mistral Warship, carrying 1,000 tons of aid from France was refused entry to Myanmar waters. In the same disaster, the United States offered disaster management aid through 22 helicopters commanded by General Tan Shwee (the USS Essex Warship). Myanmar also refused this offer, except for a number of social workers who landed in Rangoon with a small C-130 aircraft. This rejection was caused by strained relations between Myanmar and the United States and Europe after they issued embargo on Myanmar. On the other hand, Myanmar built stronger bilateral relations with China and India, the US competitors (New York Times, 2010).

In the case of famine due to the civil war followed by drought, the Khartoum government of Sudan refused US humanitarian aid offer amounting to US \$ 1.2 billion from 1989-2001. The Sudanese government was suspicious of US hidden agenda to approach separatist groups through humanitarian assistance. There was a concern that separatist groups would use the assistance to strengthen themselves. In addition, there were suspicions surrounding the US attempt to intervene in Sudan's domestic affairs due to its deterioration and the Sudanese government relations to Al-Qaeda. Moreover, the Sudan-US relation alone was already in the high and low (USAID, 2002).

Besides being a donor country, India is also vulnerable to natural disasters, such as floods, earthquakes and droughts. In 2000, 100,000

people were victims of droughts and floods; in 2001, 20,000 died from the earthquake in Gujarat; in 2002, 300,000 people were again victims of drought, followed by the 2004 tsunami disaster, the earthquake in Kashmir in 2005, and the prolonged rainy season in Mumbai in 2006. In this condition, the Indian government refused international humanitarian assistance and chose to raise funds internally through certain mechanisms.

Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the 2008 earthquake in Wenchuan killing 70,000 people and the 2010 earthquake in Qinghai which caused 2000 deaths, China chose to refuse foreign aid from various donor agencies. The United States' financial assistance of a US\$ 100,000 cheque for disasters in China was rejected by the government on the grounds that the country was able to cope with disasters by relying on their own resources.

It is not only in conflict situations that governments are required to consider a political angle, but also natural disasters obligate governments to do the same, particularly in accepting or rejecting foreign aid. Even though in some cases the recipient country is not a large and financially stable country, political considerations encourage them to reject humanitarian assistance and try to recover from post-disaster conditions that require a large amount of financial support. Efforts to restore the economic life of the community, especially to be independent from assistance are also important considerations for that country.

STATE BEHAVIOR TERMINOLOGY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT

Understanding State Behavior in Disaster Management

State is the main actor responsible for responding to disasters in its territorial area. This is clearly stated in UN resolution No. 46/182: "The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country. Each State has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the victims of natural disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory. Hence, the affected State has the primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory."

The citation of resolution article states that humanitarian assistance is provided with the agreement and principle of consideration of the country concerned. The state is the most responsible actor for providing assistance and protection to disaster victims in their territory. Thus, the state as a unitary actor must take the first mitigation action and select which humanitarian assistance to receive. In addition, state sovereignty must be respected in the process of distributing humanitarian assistance. In principle, there are 4 roles and responsibilities of the state regarding humanitarian assistance:

1. The state is responsible for asking for help and inviting international assistance during a crisis,
2. The state is responsible for providing assistance and protection,

3. The state is responsible for monitoring and coordinating external assistance,
4. The state is responsible for drafting regulations and legal frameworks in managing disaster relief.

The policy to accept humanitarian assistance related to natural disasters is a dilemma for the country because of the fear of state sovereignty and prestige or pride decline in the international political circles. The policy for accepting humanitarian assistance is 'samaritan's dilemma', because it is assumed to create dependence on aid for the affected community.

Sovereignty holds the highest priority for a country. Sovereignty is manifested in internal and external dimensions of the state. The external aspect of sovereignty rests on 'sovereign equality', which means that the state seeks to maintain its independence in relation to other countries or other international actors. The internal dimension refers to the right of each sovereign country to determine the best policy for its citizens, including accepting or rejecting humanitarian assistance. In this dimension of sovereignty, there is also the obligation for the state to protect every citizen. Thus, the state has an obligation to create appropriate policies, such as accepting or rejecting assistance, as the means to provide protection and help citizens affected by disasters.

The policy of accepting or rejecting international humanitarian assistance is one form of state behaviors that considers various factors, including national interests, capabilities, threats and opportunities faced by the country (Viotty and Kauppy, 2013). The national goals of each country in responding to disasters are to provide assistance and protect

their affected citizens. Even in critical conditions, the state still has to consider positive and negative impacts of each policy taken. In terms of managing disasters, the affected country needs to consider its national capabilities before making policies to accept or reject assistance from certain parties. The choice of a state to build bilateral and multilateral cooperation in managing disasters should also be based on national capability and consideration of threats that the state might have to face. The threat that often becomes a state consideration in accepting international humanitarian assistance is the intervention of foreign parties towards its sovereignty. In several disaster management experiences, international humanitarian agencies often fail in approaching the government and local communities. Local governments feel that they have been intervened and cannot independently manage and decide what is best for their communities. Another threat is dependence on international humanitarian assistance. Sovereign countries will always strive to minimize their dependence on other countries or other actors. These considerations motivate countries to increase its national capability in managing disasters, starting from preparedness and emergency response to the reconstruction and rehabilitation process.

Social Capital in Disaster Management

Social capital is an approach adopted from sociology. Various definitions of social capital appear in accordance with the development of the application of the social capital approach to various fields of study. The definition of social capital according to Coleman (1990) is "social capital is determined by its function. Social capital is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities which have two main

characteristics: All entities consist of several aspects of the social structure, and these entities facilitate certain actions of individuals in the structure". According to Fukuyama (1997) social capital is "the ability to work together for shared goals in groups and organizations. Social capital can only be defined as the existence of a set of certain informal values or norms shared among group members that enable cooperation between them". Putnam (1995) states social capital as "characteristics in social organizations such as networks, norms, and social beliefs that facilitate coordination and cooperation for the common good".

Based on the various definitions given by those researchers, it can be concluded that social capital is everything related to cooperation in society or nation to achieve a better life capacity, supported by values and norms which become the main elements, such as trust (mutual trust), reciprocity, collective rules in a society or nation and other similar notions.

Social capital can be categorized in several forms including:

1. **Bonding Social Capital:** relationships or connections between individuals who are emotionally very close such as friends or family members who form strong attachments (cohesion) in a group afterward. This form of social capital is characterized by a very high degree of similarity (ethnicity, religion, race, customs, habits, etc.). This strong bond in community groups is usually a positive social capital in providing social assistance and personal support, especially in the event of a disaster (Aldrich and Meyer, 2014).
2. **Bridging Social Capital:** describes a loose relationship between individuals or acquaintances between different social groups in

different regions, different races, different customs, customs, and religions. This bond displays more demographic diversity and provides new information and resources that can help individuals to advance society. This type of social capital often comes from involvement in social organizations and political institutions, such as sports clubs, parent associations, religious groups and others (Aldrich and Meyer, 2014).

3. Linking Social Capital: relations among individuals or social groups that differ by power and authority. Unlike the two previous types of social capital, social capital linking is characterized by hierarchical relationships (Sadaka. et all, 2015).

Society is a product of social interactions and networks that they create. Each community has diverse social interaction characters, therefore, social cohesion and social division that are formed also differ from one another. Social capital is the basis of community interaction. In his research, Kenneth Green distinguishes internal and external social capital in a community. Bonding and bridging social capital are classified as internal social capital. Bridging social capital is still categorized as internal social capital because in a community there are usually diverse groups both ethnically, religiously and racially. While linking social capital is categorized as external social capital because of the hierarchical interactions. Governments, NGOs and international donor agencies are the forces from outside the community with different levels of power. The interactions formed tend to be formal and procedural.

Furthermore, in order to determine whether social capital in a specific community is existent, strong or weak, various dimensions and

indicators are operationalized. The World Bank has divided social capital into 6 dimensions, namely (Woolcock, et al, 2006):

1. **Groups and Networks:** the existence of an informal network, both horizontal and vertical. This network is manifested in the form of spontaneous, informal and irregular exchange of information and resources, as well as cooperation, coordination and mutual assistance in maximizing the use of existing resources for a better life.

2. **Trust and Solidarity:** this dimension refers to conditions where individuals can depend on relatives, neighbors, colleagues, relatives, service providers and even foreigners who will help them. At least they will not hurt these individuals.

3. **Collective Action and Cooperation:** this dimension is closely related to trust and solidarity. Trust and solidarity will lead to the desire of each individual to collaborate and take collective action to improve the conditions that exist in themselves.

4. **Information and Communication:** a mechanism that allows the flow of information centrally, for example, information dissemination through markets, service centers or communication infrastructure where everyone has access to this information.

5. **Social cohesion and inclusion:** the involvement of each individual in activities or events conducted in communities such as weddings, funerals and other activities that enhance social cohesion and solidarity. To measure social cohesion level, the percentage of members joining these activities must be calculated.

6. **Empowerment and Political Actions:** this dimension is a measurement of the level of individual satisfaction towards social

institutions (government), individual participation in politics and government, and the network capacity formed between members of the community and government or institutions that have a higher power.

State Behavior and Social Capital Framework Operationalization

There are various literature references that explore the relationship between the sovereign state as the main actor and international donor actors in responding to natural disasters. These studies are increasingly developing with various perspectives with a growing tendency to emphasize the role of disaster-stricken countries or disaster-prone countries to further improve self-sufficiency in facing disasters. Self-sufficiency is a terminology that is often used for a country which relies on its own national resources and minimizes humanitarian assistance interventions. In the framework of state behavior described by Viotty and Kauppy, the countries' decision to establish bilateral and multilateral cooperation in managing disasters is also based on national capabilities and concerns of threat that the state might encounter. In this case, social capital occupies a position on national and local capabilities. The operationalization of the concepts, theories and approaches described above can be illustrated in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Framework Operationalization by Author

SOCIAL CAPITAL AS STATE CAPABILITY RESOURCE IN MANAGING DISASTER

The 26th ALNAP (Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action) meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 2010 emphasized the importance of cooperation between international humanitarian actors to work with local actors, specifically local government. International humanitarian actors must respect the sovereignty of the state and its role as the main actor in managing disasters. The meeting raised the issue of Myanmar's policy in refusing

foreign humanitarian aid during the Nargis hurricane disaster and also the effort of African and Asian countries to be self-sustaining in managing the 2004-2005 Tsunami disaster (ALNAP, 2010). The ALNAP conference is one indication of advancement in disaster politics and humanitarian assistance. It shows that the role and significance of the state as the main actor who must be responsible for mitigating natural disasters experienced by the people within its sovereignty are increasing.

Harvey (2010) supported the need to increase state capacity in managing natural disasters. There are three important messages Harvey presented in his writing. First, one of the goals of international humanitarian actors should be encouraging and supporting countries to fulfil their responsibilities to help and protect their citizens in the event of a disaster. Second, several studies or reports on humanitarian actions often indicate that international humanitarian donors ignore the central role of state, neutrality and independence in conducting humanitarian actions. Third, for humanitarian and political reasons as well as economic effectiveness, countries should invest in their own resources to help and protect their affected citizens.

The shift in the paradigm of the affected country's role is also mentioned by Harmer and Cotterrell (2005). Developing countries that are also prone to disasters start to increase their capacity for disaster mitigation. These countries begin to respond to disasters without involving external assistance. Mozambique, one of the developing countries of Africa, is trying to rely on national capacity to deal with hurricanes and natural disasters in 2007. (Foley, 2007) Mozambique's success proves that the central role of local government is very

important for disaster mitigation. Another study suggested that India also managed the 2004 Tsunami disaster without international humanitarian assistance. (Price and Bhatt, 2009).

One national capacity which became an important point in supporting the success of several countries or communities in dealing with disasters without humanitarian intervention from foreign parties is social capital. In contrast to the traditional approach which focuses on external factors referring to standard variables such as physical damage, regulation, socio-economic status and assistance, the approach to social capital refers to the values, norms, solidarity and trust that exist in social groups.

There are practices in various countries where governments choose to optimize their social capital when a disaster struck. Nakagawa and Shaw (2004), Adger et al. (2005), Dynes (2005) and Tatsuki (2008) believe social capital as inherent and cannot be ignored in analyzing the success of preparedness, mitigation and disaster recovery efforts. Daniel P. Aldrich, a disaster researcher writing extensively about the interrelationships between social capital and disasters, investigates mechanisms through which social and network capital (network) helped to manage community and post-disaster development. It was a comparative study; taking an example from the Tokyo earthquake in 1923, the Kobe earthquake in 1995, and the Tsunami on the Indian Ocean Coast in 2004. The study concludes that disaster-prone areas such as Indonesia, India, Vietnam and China need to create a visionary approach to manage disasters by designing post-disaster development policies based on social capital in order to strengthen the community (Aldrich, 2012).

Previously, Aldrich has also highlighted the role of social capital in building resilience in post-crisis communities. Aldrich (2010) argues that recovery from natural disasters and other disasters does not depend on the amount of aid received and is neither based on the severity of the damage caused, but actually relies on social capital that binds members of the affected community. Aldrich concludes that social capital serves as the main driver in long-term recovery.

In another article, Aldrich (2011) compares the success of post-disaster recovery operations in several villages in southeast India that suffered after the tsunami disaster in 2004. Through his writing, Aldrich describes several villages experiencing discrimination in receiving assistance from government and international donors during disasters due to differences in ethnicity, gender and religion. Aldrich classifies village groups into villages that have bonding social capital and strong linking social capital and villages with strong social bonding capital but weak linking social capital. Villages that receive assistance from the government and international donors are categorized as villages that have strong linking social capital. While villages that only have strong group ties (kinship) are villages that rely solely on social capital bonding because they do not receive foreign aid. Aldrich discovers that villages that were discriminated in receiving post-disaster assistance experienced a faster recovery process compared to villages that received assistance. Aldrich demonstrates that the type of social capital which becomes the most needed in dealing with disasters is bonding social capital, a strong attachment between citizens in a region or community.

Kenneth Green (2014) further discovers that the strength of social capital can reduce risk and vulnerability to disasters. In his writing, Green explains about the Ayerwaddy region in Myanmar as an isolated area which lacked access to the government. The government itself was the link to the outside (international) aid. In the event of the cyclone wind disaster that hit Myanmar in 2008, this village was able to overcome the disaster and experience a process of recovery and rebuilding by relying on social capital bonds because the region was isolated. Green also states that learning for disaster preparedness requires linking social capital, namely the role of the government to provide education about disasters to reduce the risks.

In the case of the 2009 earthquake in West Sumatra, Sinulingga (2015), includes that after the disaster, international social capital as linking social capital did not appear to be significant after the rehabilitation and reconstruction period because of strong local social cohesion. Specifically during the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, this process prioritized the community-based development model by emphasizing social capital bonding. It means that the local community had strong social capital for post-disaster recovery, where the existence of social capital was motivated by cultural values and local wisdom. In the emergency response phase that lasted from 30 September 2009 to 30 November 2009, bonding social capital was slightly significant compared to bridging social capital and linking social capital. This was caused by panic over disaster and concern of the people to save themselves and their families. However, in mid-2010, international humanitarian activities were completed and the implementation and responsibility of working groups began to be

transferred to the relevant government agencies. The availability of linking social capital in West Sumatra, especially with the post-earthquake of 2009 was shorter compared to the availability of linking social capital (international social capital) in other disaster-prone areas such as Aceh, West Java and Yogyakarta. Mutual cooperation and tribal solidarity that have become shared values became the source of bonding social capital. The Minangkabau community has an unwritten customary norm 'Kaba hurak bahambauan', which means that every disaster (bad news) must be a shared concern. The establishment of the Pokmas is one of the government's efforts to empower social capital bonding.

A country's self-sufficiency can be developed by strengthening and optimizing the state's internal social capital. The community is the main door to build a country's resilience to disasters. Bonding social capital in the form of cohesiveness within the community is required to create a disaster resilient society. Society cohesiveness can be strengthened by exploring and reviving local wisdom of the community. The community's ownership and participatory values in disaster management are important to build a disaster-responsive community. The role of the state is also needed to synergize social capital at local and national levels.

CONCLUSION

Disaster as a global phenomenon cannot be separated from strengthening transnational solidarity as a form of response. However, international disaster management cooperation in various countries has been challenged by the humanitarian assistance politicization conducted by international donor agencies; in order to achieve their

interests in the recipient countries. On the other hand, the enforcement of state sovereignty is considered as an obstacle to transnational concern in dealing with disasters. Through various descriptions explained in previous section, it is expected that there are lessons to be learned and strengthening state policies related to disaster management and international humanitarian aid should be taken into account. In its policy regarding foreign aid for disasters, Indonesia has begun to change its policy orientation regarding disasters with the One-Door Policy for the past five years. Even though it does not signify closing the country's doors to foreign aid, it provides a more selective approach in accepting foreign assistance as a response to disasters. The change in Indonesian policy orientation is in line with the trend of political and economic dynamics transition in disaster management at the global level.

There are two conclusions derived from the operationalization of the conceptual framework and analysis. The first is related to the irreplaceable role of the state in very complex disaster problems. The state remains the primary and final gate in responding to disasters. Strengthening the role of the state is needed especially when the state chooses to minimize the roles of international donor institutions and to optimize its national capacity. It is assumed that the state knows best about the needs of people in its region. Therefore, the state should understand the correct approaches to meet the needs of its people. The country's capacity to respond to disasters represents the ability of the state to choose the appropriate policy under critical conditions. Second, cohesive and synergetic social capital, particularly bonding social capital, is the main capability that a state should have in facing the threat

of humanitarian intervention when responding to disasters. Concerns about humanitarian intervention encourage states to strengthen their social capital, especially bonding social capital within the community. The disaster response community is one of the main capitals for a country to achieve self-sufficiency. It is important that governments take a pro-active approach to build responsive and adaptive communities against disasters. Cooperation among relevant government institutions is equally significant. In essence, it becomes compulsory for a government to discover and select the appropriate relations form to synergize social capital (local, national and international) in disaster management.

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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ASEAN TOURISM STRATEGIC PLAN (ATSP) IN INDONESIA'S MARINE TOURISM POLICY

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Abstract

Indonesia is the world's largest maritime nation. Almost 2/3 of the total territorial is the sea. This condition should be able to be utilized in the capacity development of Indonesia both in the regional and international order in all aspects that emphasize the condition of geographic of Indonesia. Tourism is one of the important sectors of the Indonesian government under the leadership of Presiden Joko Widodo - Jusuf Kalla. Through NAWACITA, the Government incorporates tourism as one of the sectors used in the development of Indonesia capacity. Marine tourism has become one of the important elements in the framework of tourism development policy in the context of NAWACITA. This article will look at how the implementation of ASEAN Tourism Strategic Plan (ATSP) in Indonesian's Policy, and how Indonesia's potentials and opportunities in tourism.

Keywords

Marine Tourism; ATSP; Policy; Strategic; Implementation

PRELIMINARY

This paper is a result of research that has been carried out regarding the implementation of tourism policies in the context of the Southeast Asian region (ASEAN) into Indonesia's national policy. This paper gives a more specific focus from the initial research that describes the overall context of tourism. This paper is limited to the marine tourism sector as an object of study. Regional policies on tourism policy (ASEAN Tourism Strategic Plan) are the beginning of this paper. The next discussion was continued by looking at the context of marine tourism policies carried out by Indonesia. From the two discussions above, these will be seen as the form of implementation of marine Tourism policy by Indonesia based on regional tourism policies or the ASEAN Tourism Strategic Plan.

According to United Nations, World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) tourism comprises the activities of persons traveling to and staying in places outside their usual environment for not more than one consecutive year leisure, business and other purposes (UNWTO: 2016). Tourism is considered a high potential industry with its ability to develop and grow rapidly. In this case, the ASEAN Member States mostly gravitate the interest of other countries outside ASEAN and perform as the attractive destinations to be visited (Chheang: 2013). ASEAN recognizes a different viewpoint in explaining tourism compared to other regions. It's reflected through the way ASEAN endorses its tourism by focusing not only on its economic development but also the effort to introduce its ideologies and symbol of ethnic and identity (Sofield: 2000).

One of the main priorities of ASEAN is the ballooning of the economic sector among the countries in ASEAN. The establishment of Sub-Committee of Tourism (SCOT) under the ASEAN Committee related to trade and tourism has proven the essential intention of ASEAN in the tourism sector for giving birth to more income for the ASEAN Member States. SCOT was established in 1976 aimed to initiate development in the regional tourism sector in the promotion, marketing, and research. The development of the economic sector in ASEAN has proceeded to the arrangement of a conference used to boost tourism in ASEAN to grow and evolve. The conference which was held at Genting Highland, Malaysia in 1981, eventually named ASEAN Tourism Forum (ATF) (Amalia: 2016). ATF can be considered as multilateral cooperation in ASEAN aimed to endorse and promote the variety of culture, endemic habitat, and exotic places in ASEAN as the prominent destinations in the world. ATF consists of 5 based purposes such as:

1. To promote ASEAN as an attractive destination in all aspects;
2. To stimulate and increase the awareness of the essential role of ASEAN as a prominent destination relies on its competitiveness in Asia;
3. To attract the desire of more tourist to visit the tourism destination of ASEAN Member States;
4. To promote the internal journey of ASEAN;
5. To strengthen the cooperation among states in the tourism industry sector in ASEAN

As it had started in the establishment of ASEAN Tourism Forum, development of the tourism sector of the ASEAN Member States is

referenced on the road map for Integration of Tourism Sector (RITS) (Amalia: 2016). In order to achieve the goals, a further effort such as composing a new strategy to boost the development and effectiveness of the tourism sector has been made. This strategy seems to be successful, which is seen from the increasing number of cooperation related to the tourism sector among the ASEAN Member States, that indicates the determination where there have been signed a long-term plan focused on the tourism in ASEAN which has been recognized as ASEAN Tourism Strategic Plan (ATSP) 2011-2015.

ATSP 2011-2015 aimed to build a blueprint related to policies, products, and projects in the sphere of marketing, product development, the standard of product, development of human resources, investment and communication among the ASEAN Member States. ATSP is also projected to be eligible for further development in the shape of implementation for domestic or local scale in the ASEAN Member States in order to strengthen the bargaining position in the tourism sector as its purpose to increase income for each country through its contribution.

The ASEAN Member States adopt ATSP as further action and the base of policy making regarding the tourism sector. In this article, writers would like to highlight the manifestation of ATSP policy in Indonesia which focused on the development of marine tourism. This writing is referenced on Foreign Policy concept by K. J. Holsti as the conceptual base focuses on the role of national construct towards foreign policy. In his book “Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy”, Holsti handovers the argument that the specific roles performed by states are highly influential for the arrangement of foreign

policy managed by the governments (Holsti: 1970). Policy making in states is also influenced by discourses, issues, and domestic politics.

Holsti offers a study of foreign policy oriented on the role of domestic politics in foreign policy making, especially in the construct of national roles in foreign policy. According to Holsti, states tend to make a policy based on their roles related to the national identities. In his writings, Holsti explains the concept of internal development in Indonesia. The foreign policy making in Indonesia tends to be referenced on the national interest to increase domestic development. This analysis has to be in accordance with the context of the research period. The necessity of social-economic and the perception towards the threat from foreign actors is considered as the variable in determining the national construct of Indonesia.

The status of a state is determined by internal and external sources. The construct of the national role of policymaker as the internal sources is based on geographical circumstances, the capability of state, social-economical needs, national values, ideology, public opinion, characteristic, and political interest. On the other hand, the ordinance of policy rests on the considerations of the existing structure of systems such as law, common principles, common comprehension, values, and global opinion.

ASEAN TOURISM DEVELOPMENT PLAN

There are three base strategic directives composed in ASEAN Regional Forum, which are the part of ATSP. The strategic directives are the development of experiential regional products and creative marketing along with investment strategy, the increase of service

qualities and human resources, and the rise and accelerating of service facilities as well as ASEAN connectivity. Each strategic directive pervade to the development of experiential regional products, creative marketing, and investment strategy have their own based distributions which are more specific with the main focuses such as ASEAN Tourism Marketing, the development of regional and sub-regional tour packages, and the increase of external relations tourism procedures covers the investing strategy.

The second strategic directive is the raising of service qualities and human resources. This strategic directive contains of three main focuses which are the developing of a set of ASEAN tourism standard in the certification process, the implementation of Mutual Recognition Arrangement (MRA) in order to bring ASEAN tourism to professionalism, and extending the opportunity to the ASEAN society in order to raise their knowledge and skills to develop. The third strategic directive is the rise and accelerating of service facilities and ASEAN connectivity focused on tendering a single visa for the ASEAN region and the cooperation with related ASEAN bodies in order to broaden the connectivity.

DIRECTION OF INDONESIA'S MARINE TOURISM POLICY

Under the administration of Joko Widodo, the tourism sector has become one of the main priorities of the Indonesia development which is crystal clearly indicated in IMEPP, it shows that the tourism sector is on the fifth list of development priority after Infrastructure, maritime, energy, and food (Dadang: 2016). In 2016 Joko Widodo also put one of the main focus on Indonesia tourism development which was implied explicitly on his commands in the cabinet conference on January 4,

2016, with two of eight commands were to boost the acceleration of Indonesia tourism development. The commands were to ensure the progress of ten national tourism destinations as well as the necessity of an integrated system in promoting commerce, tourism, and investment (Dadang: 2016). Moreover, in the NAWACITA priority agenda point six has been mentioned concerning the increase of competitiveness by utilizing the untouched highly potential sources effectively in order to increase the acceleration of national economic development such as infrastructure, food industry, the maritime sector, and tourism.

Ministry of Tourism has been attempting to create a policy related to Indonesia's tourism strategy for four years period of time (2015 – 2019). The policy namely Indonesia's tourism competitiveness development program which eventually is divided into five base strategies, as follows;

1. Development of Destination and Industry;
2. Expansion of Worldwide Tourism Marketing;
3. Expansion of Archipelago Tourism Marketing;
4. Development of Tourism Institutional;
5. Development of Management Support.

This article will be highlighting the policies related to marine tourism development explicitly. In five tourism development strategies, the government puts the extra credit to three strategic sectors pervade to Development of Destination and Industry, Development of Worldwide Tourism Marketing, and Development of Archipelago Tourism Marketing.

A. Development of Destination and Industry.

There are four aspects of Indonesia tourism development of destination and industry pervade to development of tourism ecosystem and infrastructure, development of nature, culture, and artificial tourism, the increase of tourism destination governance and people empowerment, and development of tourism industry. Each aspect of Indonesia tourism development of destination and industry has its main focus and strategic plan.

The first aspect, development of destination and industry executed by developing the tourism ecosystem and infrastructure included a tourism destination planning (National Tourism Strategic Region/KSPN and National Tourism Development Region/KPPN) and the rise of accessibility, attraction, amenity, and tourism ecosystem. The strategic plan by the Penyusunan Master plan dan Rencana Detail KSPN/KPPN or the arrangement of the master plan and the detailed plan of KSPN/KPPN (deconstruction). In 2016 the Ministry of Tourism had provided 34 provinces with facilitation in order to develop infrastructure and ecosystem. It shows progress and betterment from the previous year which was only 28 provinces (Kemenpar: 2016).

Another strategic plan was also taken in order to achieve the aim which was to organize KSPN development crossover-sector strategic coordination and program synergy with the related ministries or institutions, Regional Governments; Regional Government; the development of tourism special economic region zone (KEK) by means of a coordination with Governments of Provinces and National KEK Council in managing the proposal of the decree of Tourism Regional Special Economic Zone, crossover-sector coordination as the support to accessibility infrastructure and tourism amenity with related ministries. In order to boost the support and synergy among the sectors,

the government has conducted the development for the accessibility in 25 KSPN and 10 Priority Tourism Destinations. The rise of the accessibility in 10 Priority Tourism Destinations pervades to the advancement of the entrance of tourism areas in order to enable the domestic and foreign tourists to access the tourism areas in an easier way. Herewith, here is enclosed the 10 Priority Tourism Destinations accessibility development data:

TABLE 1.1 THE ADVANCEMENT OF ACCESSIBILITY

No.	Destinasi Pariwisata Prioritas	Peningkatan Aksesibilitas
1	Toba	Perpanjangan landasan Bandara Silangit dan Bandara Sibisa, Pembangunan Jalan Tol Kuala Namu - Parapat.
2	Tanjung Kelayang	Peningkatan status Bandara HAS Hanandjoedin menjadi Bandara Internasional, peningkatan kualitas jalan akses dari Bandara menuju Destinasi Pariwisata Tanjung Kelayang.
3	Tanjung Lesung	Pembangunan Bandar Udara, Pembangunan Jalan Tol Serang-Panimbang, Re-Aktivasi Jalan Kereta Api & Usulan Jalur Baru Rel KA.
4	Kepulauan Seribu - Kota Tua Jakarta	Perencanaan teknis dan pengurusan status Bandara Airstrip Pulau Panjang, peningkatan kapasitas 4 pelabuhan (Sunda Kelapa, Marina, Muara Angke, Muara Kamal), penambahan jumlah pelayaran / trip per day.
5	Borobudur	Ground breaking Bandara Kulon Progo, Peningkatan Bandara Ahmad Yani.
6	Bromo Tengger Semeru	Pengembangan Bandara Abdurrahman Saleh, peningkatan dan pembangunan infrastruktur jalan tol dan penghubung ke KSPN BTS dari Pintu Masuk.
7	Mandalika	Pengembangan Long Distance Ferry, BRT (Bus Rapid Transit), Jalan Raya Sengkol-Kuta,
8	Labuan Bajo	Perpanjangan landasan dan peningkatan fasilitas Bandara Komodo, Penambahan Direct Flight ke Labuan Bajo, pembangunan Kawasan Marina Wisata dan Kawasan Pelabuhan Labuan Bajo.
9	Wakatobi	Perluasan terminal dan perpanjangan runway Bandara Matohara di Pulau Wangi-Wangi, dan penambahan rute penerbangan langsung ke Wakatobi.
10	Morotai	Peningkatan bandara, pembangunan Pelabuhan Apung Daruba.

According to the data, it indicates the main advancement of accessibility in Indonesia marine tourism sector has been one of the

main priorities of the government. It has been shown by focusing on 8 of 10 priority destinations which are in the sector of marine tourism and the advancement of accessibility has also been emphasized to 8 of 10 Indonesia Priority Tourism Destinations.

The second aspect was the development of nature, culture, and artificial tourism. The main focus of this aspect was to advance the spa and culinary tourism, religious and historical tourism, local wisdom and cultural art tourism, village and city tourism, the advancement of marine tourism, wandering and ecological tourism, tourism integrated zone, and conventional, sport and recreation tourism. In order to back up the purpose to advance the nature, culture, and artificial tourism, the strategic plan being conducted was to develop advance the spa and culinary tourism, religious and historical tourism, local wisdom and cultural art tourism, village and city tourism, the advancement of marine tourism, wandering and ecological tourism, tourism integrated zone, and conventional, sport and recreation tourism. The data shows that the government has succeeded to develop 25 locations of the nature, culture, and artificial tourism pervade to (1) KSPN Nongsa – Abang Island, (2) KSPN Natuna, (3) KSPN Ijen-Baluran, (4) KSPN Gili Tramen, (5) KSPN Weh, (6) KSPN Toba, (7) KSPN Teluk Dalam-Nias, (8) KSPN Tanjung Kelayang, (9) KSPN Kota Tua - Sunda Kelapa, (10) KSPN Kep Seribu, (11) KSPN Borobudur, (12) KSPN Bromo-Tengger-Semeru, (13) KSPN Kuta-Sanur-Nusa Dua, (14) KSPN Kintamani-Batur Lake, (15) KSPN Menjangan-Pemuteran, (16) KSPN Rinjani, (17) KSPN Komodo Island, (18) KSPN Ende-Kelimutu, (19) KPSN Sentarum, (20) KSPN Tanjung Puting, (21) KSPN Bunaken, (22) KSPN Toraja, (23) KSPN Wakatobi, (24) KSPN Morotai, dan (25) KSPN Raja Ampat (Kemenpar: 2016). Those data

are the development of the previous year which was only focused on 16 locations. Another finding is the fact that most of the development of nature, culture, and artificial tourism was concerned about marine tourism. On the other hand, the achievement had been reached by the advancement of nature, cultural and artificial tourism was the increase of Yacht and Cruise ships visit number, World Halal Tourism award in 2016, the increase of Geopark tourism visit number, and the rise of visit number of MICE (Meeting, Incentive, Convention, Exhibition) tourism destinations.

The third aspect was to advance the governance of tourism destination and people empowerment pervade to the increase of tourism awareness and the advancement of people enterprises potential in the tourism sector. The advancement of tourism destination governance had been focused on 26 locations included 2 additional locations. The strategic plan being conducted in order to advance the governance of tourism destinations and people empowerment was the establishment of Destination Management Organization (DMO), strengthening the awareness of tourism, increasing the people capacity, and internalization of tourism awareness and *sapta pesona*. The success of achievement was also being influential for the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darusallam, in particular, Sabang Island which had reached the accomplishment target up to 80%. Sabang Island focused on three main components such as Yacht, Cruise and Diving. The early target aimed to be reached in Yacht sector was 34 ships but the target had been out stood to 37 ships with the performance rate 108%, Cruise was targeted on 7 and successfully exceeded 10 (130%) and Diving with the early target up to 4852 consumers reached the percentage of 87,28 percent of the target with 4235 (Kemenpar: 2016). The fourth aspect was the

development of tourism industry concentrated on tourism enterprises partnership and tourism investment, expanding the tourism enterprises certification and standard, and upgrading the variety and the competitiveness of tourism service product in each tourism destinations. The performance had been made in the development of tourism with the base of investment was up to US\$1.253,88 millions namely 83% of the early target. However, the strategic plan getting carried out in order to boost the tourism industry development was the implementation of green hotel orientation, the arrangement of Indonesia National Standard of tourism service enterprises and tourism means enterprises, tourism enterprises investment facilitation, and the expansion and increase of skills level of domestic worker in the tourism sector.

B. Expansion of Worldwide Tourism Marketing

Worldwide tourism marketing was driven to incur a high number of foreign tourist by means of promotions and focused market segment management, included the raising up of Indonesia tourism image, developing of tourism marketing strategy and communication that is suitable with the focus of the market based on the regions (Southeast Asia, Pacific Asia, Europe, Middle East, America and Africa) and the augmentation of promotion of nature, culture, and artificial tourism products based on the focus and demands of the market. Worldwide tourism marketing was executed by several tourism marketing development strategic plans pervade to the branding of Wonderful

Indonesia as the World's Main Tour Destination through electronic medias for the foreign market such as Discovery Channel, Fox, MNC, Google Indonesia, Trip Advisor, Amazing Race, Integrated Tourism Promotion among National, Province, and Regency/City, tourism marketing using BAS, DOT, and POS approachment along with the nature, cultural, and artificial tourism (Marine Tourism) promotion.

C. Expansion of Archipelago Tourism Marketing

Archipelago Tourism Marketing was directed to boost the number of tourist tour in Indonesia using the approachment of personal market segment, business market segment, and government by promoting 3 main products pervade to nature, cultural, and artificial tourism, nature tourism such as marine, ecology, and adventure tourism, cultural tourism such as heritage and religious, culinary and expenditure as well as city and village tourism, and artificial tourism such as MICE and Event, sports, and integrated zone tourism. The expansion of the archipelago tourism marketing strategy was advanced by focusing on the integration of marketing (DOT), Promotion (BAS), and Media aspect (POS) as what has been enclosed.

The strategic activities that will be done under the framework of national tourism development on marketing purpose consisted by *Branding Pesona Indonesia*, integrating every single stakeholder in any part of the society including digital and non-digital media such as Metro, Kompas Group, MNC, also the participation of BUMN/BUMD and private sectors. The promotion of events in local tourism spots will be a part of government's tourism development effort, involving: Nature Tourism, such as: Danau Toba Festival, Danau Sentani Festival, Raja

Ampat Festival: Cultural Tourism, such as: Keraton Ambon Festival, Culinary Festival in several capital of provinces in Indonesia: Artificial Tourism, such as: *Tour de Singkarak* in West Sumatera, Jakarta Maraton: Marine Tourism, such as: Tambora Marine Festival, Sail Karimata, Archipelago Commemoration Day. On the other hand, the campaign of Maritime Culture also happening and successfully turned the Archipelago Commemoration Day into the top event of Maritime Tourism Week in Middle or East Indonesia, not to mention the encoding and development of National Marketing Strategy and Market Segmentation of Tourist.

IMPLEMENTATION OF ATSP IN INDONESIA'S MARINE TOURISM

This part will genuinely on the implementation of ATSP in a form of national tourism policy for marine tourism. From the previous explanation regarding ATSP and Indonesia tourism policies, the correlation and implementation of the ATSP itself are coming from the three major strategies stated in ASEAN Tourism Strategic Plan who is being escalated into Indonesia tourism policy. The analysis consisted by:

1. Implementation of Regional Products Development and Marketing Also Investment Strategy

Under the direction of regional products development and marketing also investment strategy, ASEAN Tourism Strategic Plan 2011-2015 divided the points into three which are, the marketing strategy, regional tourism package, and sub-regional tourism package also the external relations and ASEAN tourism procedure

including investment. Three indicators to analyze the implementation of ASTP in Indonesia tourism as following below:

i. Tourism Marketing Strategy for ASEAN Countries

The tourism marketing strategy is implemented by Indonesia tourism policy through two points of marketing development for Indonesia tourism consisted by domestic and international tourism. The marketing strategy of tourism in Indonesia surely has its own considerations. For international tourism, the government is stressing over the point of developing the image of the tourism objects itself while also empowering the technique of marketing communication, focusing on countries in South East Asia. On the other hand, the rising of natural, cultural, and artificial tourism can be used to boost Indonesia tourism for international purpose.

For domestic tourism, our government is stressing on the escalation of the amount of personal market segmentation, business market segmentation through three major products which are, the marine tourism, ecology tourism, and adventure tourism. Cultural tourism such as heritage and religious, culinary and expenditure as well as city and village tourism, and artificial tourism such as MICE and Event, sports, and integrated zone tourism.

ii. Regional and Sub-Regional Tourism Package

On this section of Regional and Sub-Regional tourism package, our government has successfully implemented this thing through the development of destination and industry of tourism. Along with the process of the development, there are several indicators that used such

as infrastructure and ecosystem development for tourism including the arrangement of the tourism destination itself, to begin with.

The improvement of accessibility, attraction, amenity, and the ecosystem of tourism, also natural, cultural, and artificial tourism spots is involving the rising of culinary and spa tourism, historical and religious tourism, art and cultural tourism, rural and urban tourism, not to mention, marine tourism, ecology and adventure, conventional tourism, last but not least, sport tourism. All those things mentioned are undeniable proofs of the implementation of regional and sub-regional tourism package. The simplification of ATSP implementation in marine tourism, as following below:

TABLE 1.2 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICIES

ATSP 2011-2015	Implementasi kebijakan pariwisata di masa pemerintahan Jokowi
1. Implementasi pengembangan produk kawasan dan pemasaran serta strategi investasi	
A. Strategi pemasaran pariwisata ASEAN	Strategi pemasaran mancanegara a. peningkatan citra kepariwisataan, mengembangkan strategi dan komunikasi pemasaran sesuai dengan fokus pasar berdasarkan wilayah yang salah satunya adalah negara-

	<p>negara dikawasan Asia Tenggara.</p> <p>b. peningkatan promosi produk wisata baik wisata alam, budaya maupun buatan</p> <p>Strategi Pemasaran Nusantara</p> <p>a. peningkatan jumlah segmen pasar personal, segmen pasar bisnis dan pemerintah melalui tiga produk utama yakni wisata alam yang terdiri dari wisata bahari, wisata ekologi, dan wisata petualangan. Wisata budaya yang terdiri dari wisata heritage dan religi, wisata kuliner dan belanja, dan wisata kota dan desaserta Wisata ciptaan yang terdiri dari wisata MICE & Event, wisata olahraga, dan wisata kawasan terpadu</p>
<p>B. Pengembangan Paket Wisata Kawasan dan Sub-Kawasan</p>	<p>Pengembangan destinasi dan Industri pariwisata.</p> <p>Pembangunan Infrastruktur dan Ekosistem Pariwisata:</p> <p>(1) Perancangan destinasi pariwisata (kawasan strategis pariwisata nasional dan kawasan pengembangan pariwisata nasional),</p> <p>(2) Peningkatan aksesibilitas, atraksi, amenitas, dan ekosistem pariwisata;</p> <p>Pengembangan Destinasi Wisata alam, budaya, dan buatan:</p> <p>(1) Pengembangan wisata kuliner dan spa, wisata sejarah dan religi, wisata tradisi dan seni</p>

	<p>budaya, wisata perdesaan dan perkotaan,</p> <p>(2) Pengembangan wisata bahari, wisata ekologi dan petualangan, kawasan pariwisata terpadu, serta wisata konvensi, olahraga dan rekreasi</p> <p>Pengembangan industri pariwisata:</p> <p>(1) Peningkatan keragaman dan daya saing produk jasa pariwisata di setiap destinasi pariwisata</p>
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The attached table above is showing us the entire tourism policies in Indonesia. Under the context of marine tourism, we can clearly tell that Indonesia is focusing on the development and selection of the most potential marine sectors itself. The reflection of this idea can be seen through our President's direction regarding tourism on 6th of November 2015. Stated on the first point, the government is expecting The Ministry of Tourism to classify 10 best tourism destinations to be prioritized and supported by strengthening the policies, programs, and activities. Hence, 8 out of those 10 best tourism destinations are marine tourism which are Danau Toba in North Sumatera, Labuan Bajo in East Nusa Tenggara, Tanjung Kelayang in Bangka Belitung, Tanjung Lesung in Banten, Kepulauan Seribu in Jakarta, Mandalika in West Nusa Tenggara, Wakatobi in Southeast Sulawesi, last but not least Morotai in Maluku.

CONCLUSION

Most direction of Indonesia tourism policy in terms of developing the existence of marine tourism itself, have pretty much implemented ASEAN Tourism Strategic Plan 2011-2015. This concluded by several data taken from the analysis of Indonesia tourism policy that has been done by certain stakeholders. Out of three main strategy plan stated in ATSP, the government has successfully contributed themselves concretely through marine policies on the level of regional products development and creative marketing, not to mention the investment strategy involving regional and sub-regional tourism package addressed by national level policy which are The Development of Tourism Destination and Industry, The Development of International Tourism Marketing, also The Development of Archipelago Tourism Marketing as the main program. Two other points stated in ATSP mentioning about the improvement of services quality, human resources, and facilitation generally discussed under the context of tourism.

Besides, what we also need to concern about in the development of marine tourism in Indonesia itself which take places in 8 out of 10 most prioritized tourism destinations which are Danau Toba in North Sumatera, Labuan Bajo in East Nusa Tenggara, Tanjung Kelayang in Bangka Belitung, Tanjung Lesung in Banten, Kepulauan Seribu in Jakarta, Mandalika in West Nusa Tenggara, Wakatobi in Southeast Sulawesi, and last but not least Morotai in Maluku cannot actually give us the concrete situation of how actually marine tourism in Indonesia is happening. This assumption is being driven by unequal priority of tourism destinations in each part of Indonesia. One way or another a

massive solution is required to be found for this issue in order to create a better policy that will cater the entire country from Sabang to Merauke. On the other hand, the existence of "Grand Design" is being expected to come as soon as possible in order to apply the success in Indonesia marine tourism which will become the responsibility of any actor involved.

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FRAMING THREAT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS POLITICS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

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Abstract

This chapter examines the International Relations on the key features of threats. Different theories in International Relations provide different explanations and interpretations of threats. It is important to highlight elements which contribute to the formation of these differing interpretations. Understanding the concepts, elements and processes of threats will allow development of a framework of thought to guide an analysis of issue in International Relations as a threat. This paper employs the threat politics concept grounded in the Copenhagen School's securitization theory. It finds that a threat is a social construct. Whether a public issue is securitized depends on how various actors view and identify it and on public debate and argument. Threat politics is actually a process involving powerful actors who decide to persuade others to believe that a public issue represents a threat and that certain countermeasures are required - even though the issue may not actually pose an existential threat at all.

Keywords

Threat; Threat politics; Copenhagen School's

Introduction

In International Relations literature, the subject of threats is widely discussed. Different theories have different interpretations about what threats are. Hitherto threats were defined predominately in material terms. Threats were usually associated with material capabilities such as economic and military capability. Thus, economically strong states possessed the material capability to develop modern technologically superior military capabilities.

Realists' perception of threat is predominately related to material capabilities (Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007). Further, Walt in Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero (2007) defines a threat as "a function of military power, geographical proximity, offensive capability, and aggressive intentions". States having strong material capabilities will be seen as threats that can change other states' position in the international system, causing a shift in the international balance of power. Realists believe that the international system is anarchical. There is no overarching authority to prevent states from using force to resolve a conflict. Therefore, if some states are more powerful than others, the weaker states may feel threatened. To sum up, as Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero (2007) argue, the proponents of realism believe that asymmetries in power will automatically trigger perceptions of threat and intergroup conflict.

Recently, the analysis of threats has been extended beyond traditional material security subjects to include the 'securitization' process. How are threats constructed and categorized? How do elites come to portray

another state or state act as a threat? The phenomenon of threat perception has developed from practical to conceptual level.

Weaver and Buzan (1998) define securitization theory as the process of bringing a political issue into security domain and considering many factors that may transform that issue into a security issue. “Securitization’ is a process, socially constructed, the result of human engagement and agreement (Ruggie 1998).

In addition, according to Wæver (1995), political problems become security issues not necessarily because a real existential threat exists, but because the issue is successfully presented and established by key agents as an issue that warrants entry into the security domain. Elites may do so to avoid political change that threatens their dominant position. As a result, a political problem can be portrayed as a security problem when elites declare it to be so and when it threatens their interests. Therefore, when considering the ‘securitization’ process, it is important to gain an understanding of who securitises (the actor) what (the threat subject) in the security field. Buzan et al. (1998).

These variables become the basic components when studying threat politics. They facilitate the analysis of how and why some threat images take on societal salience, and why others do not (Eriksson 2001). More specifically, Cavelti (2007) argues that threat politics looks at how, under what conditions, by whom, for what reasons, and with what impact, issues are constructed as threats to national security, and thereby moved onto the security-political agenda. Threat politics develops a model or framework to help understand the process of how an issue becomes a security issue. In conclusion, this threat theory is

useful for tracking how and why elite actors can move an issue from being marginal to being political as an existential threat. (Cavelty 2007).

The process of 'securitization' or threat identification and perception is complex and followed by the development of countermeasures by elite actors. At the first stage, there is recognition of the political 'problem'. This is when elite actors or agents devise explanations for and solutions to the problem. They may compose and construct a conceptual scheme to frame the problem and persuade others and the public that there is a threat. The aim is to make the threat and countermeasures appear simpler and easier to understand. However, who are the actors or agents who construct, compose and portray the problem as a threat? How do they frame the problem? Let us examine the steps involved in the transformation of a problem into a security threat. These steps are the policy window which is exploited by the framing actors, the threat frame and countermeasures.

The Policy Window and Framing Actors

Policy windows, or problem definitions, are central to understanding the framing of political issues or problems as security issues in the securitisation process (Cavelty 2007). This process is aimed to explore and identify the issue. At this step, there is a problem 'pops up' but it is not yet categorized as a threat. Assumptions are made by experts and other elite actors to identify the problem (Read 2013). This first stage is said to be a core stage because some issues or problems are moved from being the political or marginal into the security agenda at this phase.

The policy window presents an opportunity for actors to identify the problem and elevate it into the higher security agenda. If the problem is not elevated into the security agenda at this point, subsequent countermeasures may become too late and ineffective. Durant and Diehl (1989) argue that political windows or problem windows could be the reasons why policy windows are open. Political windows may include election campaigns where elites may raise an issue. During election campaigns, political parties and/or candidates may have specific concerns about a problem which they identify as a potential security problem. Thus, ‘framing’ actors define a problem as a security problem by exploiting the opportunity presented by a politician.

Problem window is a situation when particular experts or actors who hold positions of authority and legitimacy become aware of a problem from their studies or one highlighted by a major event. The ‘securitising’ experts or actors may attempt to highlight and publicize the security implications of a problem, and their position may give weight and legitimacy to their argument (Buzan et al. 1998). Thus, the securitisation process is socially constructed. Elite actors identify the problem and they try to transform it into a security problem through publicity and public discussion. A public discussion could also lead to alternative interpretations and arguments that challenge the elite actors. (Durant and Diehl 1989). Therefore, in this process, it is important for the ‘securitization’ actors to clearly construct and frame the problem in order to persuade others of the merits of their argument.

Threat framing

After certain elite actors identify the problem, they come to the process of diagnosis - explaining what the effect of the problem may be, what security threats it may pose. This step is the 'threat frame'. Framing the threat involves making it easier to understand the problem and the solution. Eriksson argues that the political process of threat framing involves policymakers and other nonofficial agents, such as the media and academia. They portray a problem as something that they are afraid of and the public should be afraid of (Eriksson 2001). In other words, threat framing is a process to establish and maintain the notions of threat, risk, and security. In this step, actors develop specific interpretive schemas about what should be regarded as a threat or risk, how to respond to this threat and who is responsible for it (Cavelty 2007).

In addition, Read (2013) explains that threat framing is a process designed to make sense of an issue or problem. Thus, actors must construct and compose the problem so that the public can easily understand it as a security threat and can be 'consumed' with ease. Benford and Snow (Benford and Snow 2000) explain that there are at least two components to the threat-framing task - diagnostic and prognostic framing. Diagnostic framing involves identifying a perceived problem and ascribing blame. With regard to prognostic framing, actors propose solutions to the problem and assign strategies for realizing the proposed solution. (Benford and Snow 2000).

When framing of the threat is complete and the government and public have been persuaded that a threat exists, subsequently the problem has

been placed on the security agenda. Elite threat-framing actors and policymakers will produce policy documents such as government reports and proceedings and transcripts of public hearings. Usually, these documents are written using security jargon. For example, subject X poses a national security threat or subject Y can harm national security, and so on. The more documents produced from a greater number of state agencies, the greater importance and legitimacy of the threat. This may indicate the success of the threat-framing elites in the securitization process.

The Framing Actors

As explained above, the Copenhagen School argues that certain problems may become a security issue, not because a real existential threat exists, but because the issue is successfully *presented* and *established* by key agents as a threat. However, who exactly are these elite actors? So far, only their role has been clearly explained. Actors are the people who identify and analyze the policy window, frame the threat, and suggest the government countermeasures. Anyone can identify a problem and influence others to accept it as a security problem, and accept the countermeasures offered, as long as he/she has the position and power to influence society. Such actors may include politicians, bureaucrats, technical experts, the media, pressure groups and academia (Eriksson 2001). However, the category of ‘political actors’ is very broad, as it could comprise both elected and unelected politicians, spokespeople for think tanks, agents for social movements, agents of ad hoc campaigns and non-governmental organizations. They all pursue different agendas and different interpretations of political

problems and seek to participate in the public discourse over the interpretation of threats.

However, there is no doubt that some actors are substantially more powerful and influential than others in gaining access to the media and thus have a greater impact on public perceptions. Caverty (2007) defines framing actors as

“The influential actors in and around government who are in a position to piece together coherent narratives about security issues. They are people who compete to have their voices heard and their arguments accepted as the truth—to achieve “discursive hegemony”

Meyer (2009) further argues that some people have significant influence in society; thus, if a problem is categorized as a threat, it has to be articulated by such influential actors. Therefore, the actors who can formulate the threats and shape the security agenda will include politicians with a high degree of public recognition, legitimacy and credibility across the political spectrum.

Furthermore, influential threat-framing actors will have special skills or special capital to identify and highlight threats that common people may not notice. Such threat framers will also have access to policymakers and government officials who involve in implementing countermeasures. In order to deliver their ideas, the actors usually use security speech. For example, they may testify before the US Congress to deliver the message, thereby influencing other key political actors. The more attention they get from other politicians, the easier it may be to transform and shape the security agenda (Brauch 2011).

In the process of ‘threat-framing’, the actor’s decisions may be influenced by bias. Brauch (2011) argues that threat frames emerge as the result of application and consideration of the values, resources, and beliefs of key actors. Stein (1988) also argues that these factors may lead to the misreading of a problem or the misinterpretation of others’ intention. In a worst-case scenario, such misinterpretations may lead to inappropriate countermeasures and perhaps war. Furthermore, different values and norms held by different actors may influence the public threat framing debate and challenge elite interpretations.

There are many internal and external factors that influence an actor’s decision-making throughout the securitization process, including state identity, history, as well as the actors’ norms, values and knowledge. The actors in different states have different norms and values that shape their perceptions toward the actions of others and other states. It can be seen from the beginning that threat politics is socially constructed. These factors and elements are crucial in understanding the behaviour of elite actors in the threat-framing process.

State Identity

According to Rousseau and Garcia- Retamero (2007), threat perception is not only based on power or material capabilities such as military capabilities, but also formed through ideational factors such as identity, beliefs and interpretations, and the identity of the party who makes such interpretations. States identities are influenced by a number of factors including geography, culture, sovereignty and history. Rousseau argues that the perception of another state as having a similar or shared identity will have consequences in terms of perceptions and behavior (Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007). The greater the sense of shared identity

between states, the stronger the feelings of attachment between states. Where the state identities are different, the feelings of attachment will be weaker. Similar state identities will decrease negative perceptions about the intentions of other states and encourage cooperation (Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007).

However, because identities are socially constructed, they can change from time to time, thereby changing perceptions amongst states. Identity is a result of state interactions and behavior in the international system (Sjöstedt 2013). Since identities and behavior can change, thus, today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy.

Moreover, Sjöstedt (2013) argues that the state's role in international relations is not just chosen by the state, but also partly chosen by other states. Therefore, it must be acknowledged that perceptions about state intentions are not simply objective. Perceptions may evolve according to the change of identities and interactions in the international systems. State identity relates to the interpretation of history and culture that affects the country's interactions with others. Further, state identity will influence foreign policy makers when making decisions about relations with other countries (Morris 2012). Therefore, threats are shaped by perceptions and interpretations about state identity, beliefs and values.

Other Influences on Threat Framing

History is another element considered by actors during their threat-framing. Past actions, statements and interactions affect a state's interpretation of other states. However, longstanding or fixed interpretations or perceptions can become problematic. For example, if a state already sees another state as a threat due to past behavior, this

may cloud their interpretations despite recently changed behavior by the other state (Jervis 1989).

Limitations regarding actor capacity and knowledge could also determine the framing of a threat. In framing a threat, the bias of actors may be influential. Political leaders have limited capacity and capability in processing information, thus, their rational decision making is limited and bounded. They use a number of cognitive shortcuts and heuristics to simplify the complexity and manage uncertainty. As a result, they come to generate and frame a threat from their perception (Stein 1988). This behavior is driven by the preference for simplicity and the rejection of ambiguity and dissonance. They may also miss the essence of a problem. Political leaders as humans have to assess and simplify complex threats, and in doing so, sometimes, they need to strip the nuance, context, and subtleties of problems unconsciously. Therefore, a politician's bias may be influential in the threat framing process.

Consistency also influences the actor's beliefs about threats. People have a tendency to see what they expect to see, rather than what is exactly happening. This behavior sometimes will cause actors to miss important information in their decision-making process. In addition, if they find information that is too complex to analyze they will tend to fall back on their expectations. Furthermore, the actor's decisions can also depend upon poor forecasts and poor estimations. Experts sometimes continue to defend their forecasts, even after what they expected did not happen (Tetlock 2009). In addition, according to Tetlock (2009) experts could pose "false alarm" as they think 'crying wolf is the price of vigilance'. As a result, sometimes they become

paranoid when defining threats. They do so because they think causally rather than pay attention to the frequencies with which events occur.

It is apparent that the process of threat-framing is a forecasting activity which depends on the perceptions and actions of certain elite actors. This process actually involves an estimation of how the problem is likely to develop in the future, and what the worst-case scenario may be. Experts tend to overestimate the likelihood of a threat, for example, because they can easily imagine the causal pathways to war, a highly salient occurrence that they have likely studied. They pay less attention to the threats that did not lead to war.

Resonance and Countermeasures

After framing the threat with its negative consequences, the issues move to securitisation only if the government and public accept the security argument presented by elite actors or politicians (Buzan et al. 1998). Two conditions must be satisfied for a problem to be successfully ‘securitized’ or framed as a threat—credibility and salience (Benford and Snow 2000). A threat frame is credible when it is presented without obvious contradictions, substantiated with empirical evidence, and when the actors who advocate the frame’s central message come across as reputable and sincere. This legitimizes the threat. The threat framing is salient when the threat dovetails with prevailing historical perceptions. For example, if the elite actors of a state believe that another party poses a threat because historically they usually have, then the idea of a threat from that party may resonate with key policymakers and the public, and certain countermeasures such as laws, executive orders and bureaucratic changes may follow.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined several steps entailed in the process of transforming a problem or public issue into a security issue. A framework of analysis has been presented for the analysis of this 'securitization' process. This framework will help to understand why some public issues become security issues while others do not. In addition, it will help in explaining why some public issues are securitized and become threats in some countries, whereas the same public issue in another country is not seen as a threat. To put it simply, threat politics is a social process of argument and persuasion about whether a public issue represents a threat or not.

Many actors are involved in the formulation and framing of a threat. However, not all of them have the credential, power or position to influence threat framing. To influence the threat framing process, actors must have a good reputation and be close to the government. Such actors may include politicians and policymakers. In the threat framing process, those actors initially recognize the problem and the policy window. At this moment, problems are not yet categorized as threats. The problem or public issue could emerge from either a political window or a problem window. Regarding a political window, politicians may take advantage of election campaigns to make promises regarding a public issue that may have security implications. While in the problem window scenario, a problem may simply 'pop up' and trigger public interest, analysis and debate. Once a problem has been identified, powerful actors may proceed to frame it as a threat. This involves making the identified problem simpler and easier for the public

to understand as a security problem. If the public accepts the arguments about the potential threat, the next step would be to develop countermeasures in the form of laws and executive orders.

However, during the threat framing process, actors may be influenced by their own bias, norms and cultural values when formulating policy. Perceptions about state identity may also influence policymaking. State identity is shaped by interaction amongst states. The greater the sense of shared identity between states, the more secure they are about the other states' intentions. However, if a state has a bad reputation due to previous international behavior, this could influence the perception of other states about that state's intentions. In addition, the limitation of actors' capacities and capabilities could also influence the threat-framing process and policy outcomes. To make it simple, the process actors may wish to simplify matters by relying on a bias or seeing what they want to see or believe. This may lead to misunderstandings or misinterpretations of the problem or misperceptions about the intentions of others.

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OVERVIEW OF INDONESIAN STUDENTS IN TAIWAN AND INDONESIA-TAIWAN COOPERATION ON EDUCATION

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Abstract

This paper has been submitted by the author as part of Chapter II for M.A thesis in International Master's Program in Asia-Pacific Studies, National Chengchi University, Taiwan. This chapter aim to give a brief overview of Indonesian students in Taiwan and Indonesia-Taiwan cooperation on education. The first part of this chapter will describe the education cooperation between Indonesia and Taiwan and provide a brief overview of government efforts to increase Indonesian student numbers in Taiwan. In the last part of this chapter, I will discuss Indonesian student conditions in Taiwan, as well as the efforts and policy packages of the Taiwan government to attract Indonesian students and how these have increased Indonesian student numbers in Taiwan. As a result of these initiatives, Indonesian students have become one of the main sources of international students in Taiwan.

Keywords

*Indonesian Students; Taiwan; Indonesia-Taiwan
Cooperation*

This chapter emphasizes that the internationalization of higher education in Taiwan is a component of public diplomacy initiatives envisaged by the Taiwan government (Ma, 2013). At the same time, the Indonesian government and public welcome the initiatives of the Taiwan government. As a result of these conditions, there are several cooperation initiatives between Taiwan and Indonesia, not only cultivating educational exchanges between the two countries but also increasing the number of Indonesian students in Taiwan. Therefore, the first part of this chapter will describe the education cooperation between Indonesia and Taiwan and provide a brief overview of government efforts to increase Indonesian student numbers in Taiwan.

In the last part of this chapter, I will discuss Indonesian student conditions in Taiwan, as well as the efforts and policy packages of the Taiwan government to attract Indonesian students and how these have increased Indonesian student numbers in Taiwan. As a result of these initiatives, Indonesian students have become one of the main sources of international students in Taiwan.

INDONESIA-TAIWAN COOPERATION ON EDUCATION

Indonesian students' presence in Taiwan is inseparable from government policy on both the Taiwanese side and Indonesian side. However, the pull factor from the Taiwan government has been instrumental in the increase of Indonesian student numbers in Taiwan, with the Taiwan government policy related to international students a key contributor. International students in Taiwan consist of foreign students and overseas Chinese students with these two groups distinguished by the procedure by which they were recruited and their background. The "overseas Chinese student" designation refers to those

of Chinese ancestry who was born and raised overseas until the time of school application, or Taiwanese citizens residing overseas for at least six consecutive years and who acquired visas to study abroad. The regulations also limit the definition of “overseas” to countries or regions other than Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau. Meanwhile, the “foreign student” designation refers to those who are students of foreign nationality who have never held Taiwanese nationality and do not possess overseas Chinese student status at the time of application (Ma 2013).

According to Ma (2013), there were three phases of Taiwan government policy toward the internationalization of education. The first phase was between 1950 and 1986 when the Taiwan government only recruited overseas Chinese students who mostly come from Southeast Asia. At that time, the Taiwan government under the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) attracted overseas Chinese to support their nationalist point of view and their attempt to prevent the infiltration of Chinese communism. The second phase was between 1987 and 1999 when Taiwan was in the midst of reform process. This reform also affected the education sector and saw Taiwanese demand that the government improve education quality. In addition, the recruitment policy for overseas Chinese was modified such that the qualification threshold was raised and the benefits granted to overseas Chinese students was reduced. This caused a decrease in overseas Chinese student enrollment in Taiwan educational institutions. The third phase was from 2000 until 2011 when the Taiwan government and institutions aimed to recruit foreign students to study in Taiwan because they believed that growth in the number of foreign students was vital to

future education development. This third phase as it pertains to the condition of Indonesian students in Taiwan will be further elaborated in the next part of this chapter (section 2.3).

Efforts to develop the cooperation between Indonesia and Taiwan on education through government channels started in 2011 and focused on increasing the number of Indonesian students in Taiwan. On April 2011 Taiwan Ministry of Education (MOE) invited the representative from the Indonesian Ministry of Education to come to Taiwan and discuss several issues such as a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Indonesia and Taiwan on Higher Education Cooperation, also Research Cooperation and Teaching Staff training activities with scholarships offered by the Indonesian Ministry of National Education to pursue Masters or PhD degrees in Taiwan. One month after the meeting, on May 21, 2011, the Indonesian and Taiwan governments held the “Indonesia-Taiwan Higher Education Summit” in Bali. At the summit, TETO and IETO signed the MOU on “Cooperation in the Field of Higher Education”. In addition, Indonesia and Taiwan agreed they would:

1. Facilitate exchange programs between related higher education institutions
2. Support and facilitate cooperation between registered higher education institutions, inter alia the possibilities of credit transfer and the exchange of academic staff and experts
3. Facilitate the exchange of students for the purpose of study and research with terms and condition to be jointly decided by the relevant institutions
4. Encourage joint research and international publications

5. Enable mutual recognition of degrees and professional qualifications awarded by the competent authorities according to the relevant regulations of related institutions
6. Provide scholarships to students of related universities, depending on the availability of financial means.

In addition, the summit discussed the “Indonesian Professional Training Project between Ministry of National Education of Republic Indonesia and Ministry of Education of Taiwan”. This program aimed to send one thousand university instructors as scholarship student to pursue doctoral degrees at selected universities in Taiwan from 2011 to 2016, with the scholarships coming from the Indonesia and Taiwan governments. The summit also agreed to hold the first Indonesia-Taiwan Higher Education Forum (TIHES-1) in 2012 in Taipei at National Taiwan University of Science and Technology Taiwan (NTUST) (ESIT 2012; TEC 2012; Elias 2013; Kabinawa 2013).

TIHES-1 was held from April 16–18, 2012. In the discussion and conclusion sessions, both countries agreed to cooperate on the following points:

1. To provide scholarships for Indonesian University members to do doctoral programs in Taiwan universities through a 3+1 scheme: a 3-year scholarship from the Directorate General of Higher Education, Indonesia; and a 1-year scholarship from the Taiwan government.
2. To facilitate the exchange of staff, exchange students and to promote an exchange culture, as well as joint research, joint publication, and joint degrees.

3. To hold the next summit in this series, TIHES-2, from May 16-17, 2013, in Bali, Indonesia.

TIHES-2 was held at the Institute of Indonesian Arts (ISI) Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia, from September 25-27, 2013. This activity delayed 3 months from previous plan. Joining the meeting were 25 Taiwan universities and 29 Indonesian universities. The summit discussed visa issues for students who would come to Taiwan. In the month before the summit, ESIT (Elite Study in Taiwan) and the Center for Industry of Republic of Indonesia signed an agreement on a Ministry of Industry 1+1 double degree program under which students would study one year in Indonesia and one year in Taiwan (ESIT 2016).

The third Taiwan-Indonesia Higher Education Summit was held at the NTUST from October 28-30, 2014. The summit discussed education policy, current education conditions, industry-academic collaboration, and the opportunities to conduct collaborative research and events. This summit also elaborated more on visa issues that were discussed in the previous summit. The fourth Taiwan Taiwan-Indonesia Higher Education Summit was held from October 19-21, 2016. Topics of the forum included centers of excellence in higher education, industry and university linkages, and vocational higher education.

In 2011, NTUST established a Taiwan education center in Surabaya, Indonesia, under the support of the Taiwan MOE. The purposes of the center are:

1. To promote Taiwan higher education
2. To provide guidance to Indonesian students who study in Taiwan
3. To participate in overseas education exhibitions in Indonesia

4. To promote and commence Chinese language exhibitions in Indonesia
5. To hold the annual Taiwan Higher Education Exhibition in Indonesia
6. To enhance bilateral academic cooperation between Taiwan and Indonesia

To promote Taiwan education, the Taiwan MOE and Elite Study in Taiwan, in cooperation with ICATI (*Ikatan Citra Alumni Taiwan Indonesia*/Indonesian Federation of Taiwan Alumni Association) and TEC (Taiwan Education Cooperation) held Taiwan Education Fairs in several cities in Indonesia, focusing mainly on Jakarta, Surabaya and Medan since 2010. Moreover, Taiwan education seminars were conducted nine times from 2011-2016 in Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Jakarta. As of 2016, Taiwan had established eight language centers in five cities of Indonesia: one in Jakarta, two in Yogyakarta, two in Malang, two in Bandung, and one in Makasar. In addition, TETO also opened the Taiwan Corner and Taiwan studies center in several universities in Indonesia to promote cultural exchange and Taiwan studies in Indonesia (ESIT 2016).

Moreover, the Taiwan government provides scholarships for Indonesian students through programs such as the Taiwan Scholarship under the MOE, as well as the Huayu Enrichment Scholarship, the International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF), the Ministry of Science and Technology Scholarship, the Taiwan International Graduate Program under *Academia Sinica*, the MOE Short-term research award, the MOE APEC Scholarship, the Research Grant for Foreign Scholars in Chinese Studies under the Center for Chinese

Studies, the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy fellowship, and grants from *Chiang Ching-kuo* Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange. There are also some scholarship schemes provided by universities to help international students finance their study in Taiwan.

Taiwan government policy toward international student demonstrate the evolution of Taiwan public diplomacy. Taiwan government move can be categorizing as one of the way to communicate with international public. From public diplomacy perspective, we can categorize the Taiwan government activities before 2010 as one-way communication. While they improved their approach into two-way communication after 2010 through cooperation with various institution including Indonesian government body. The policy package initiated by Taiwan government varies from government to government cooperation, university to university cooperation, institution to institution cooperation, also individual channel cooperation.

After 2000, Taiwan government and institutions strengthen their relationship with Indonesian counterpart. However, most of the initiatives still on the basis of first-tier relationship building initiatives. The initiatives focus on cultural and educational exchange programs and leadership visits. After 2016, through the New South-bound Policy initiated by Tsai Ing-wen government, Taiwan improve their public diplomacy including building the cultural and language institute, development aid projects, city twinning arrangement, relationship building campaigns, and also non-political network scheme. The government encourages to strengthen people to people relation between Taiwan and Indonesia.

INDONESIAN STUDENTS IN TAIWAN

According to Ma (2013) “based on the trajectory of policy development and the changes in numbers of international student enrollment, the course of international student recruitment in Taiwan can be divided into three stages”. Firstly, from 1950-1986 Taiwan recruited overseas Chinese students only. Secondly, from 1987-1999 Taiwan intended to provide education benefits for Taiwanese and decrease overseas Chinese enrollment numbers and did not intend to recruit foreign students. Thirdly, the period from 2000-2011 saw Taiwan shift its policy focus towards the recruitment of foreign students and the changing demographic profile of international students.

Based on Taiwanese laws toward international students, Indonesian students in Taiwan have two main statuses: foreign students and overseas Chinese students. The designation “foreign student” refers to local Indonesian citizens pursuing degrees (mostly master and doctoral degree), studying on exchange, or studying the Chinese language in Taiwan. Meanwhile, the Indonesian “Chinese student” designation identifies Indonesian ethnic Chinese students that are also pursuing degrees (mostly bachelor degrees), studying on exchange or studying the Chinese language. Before 2011, Indonesian ethnic Chinese students categorized as overseas Chinese students represented the majority of Indonesian students in Taiwan. However, from the 2011-2012 school year, the number of Indonesian local students designated as “foreign student pursuing degree in Taiwan” exceeded the number of Indonesian overseas Chinese students and the trend is growing each year.

There are several reasons international students, including those from Indonesia, decide to pursue their studies in Taiwan. Firstly, is the

academic resources and quality. Secondly is the diversity of culture. Thirdly is reasonable and affordable tuition. Fourthly is the higher standards of living. Fifthly, is the better opportunity for further studies. Sixth is the availability of scholarships. Seventh is learning Chinese. Eighth is the better opportunity for securing a job back home. Ninth is the location of Taiwan in the heart of Asia (FICHET October 2015).

Taiwan is excellence in various field such as academic resources and quality, diversity of culture, and high standard of life that can become their strength in international society. However, international public including Indonesian, did not get sufficient information about Taiwan that cause Taiwan present in international public still limited. This is one of the reason why there is still limited number of international student, including Indonesian, who is studying in Taiwan.

Before the 1990s the interaction between Indonesia and Taiwan was limited, so it's difficult to track when Indonesian students first came to Taiwan. However, according to the president of ICATI "during the 1960s there were several Indonesian students who came to Taiwan for study. They were all Overseas Chinese Students (OCS) that pursued degree level or Chinese language study in Taiwan" (Kabinawa 2013). Data compilation about Indonesian students who study in Taiwan started from 1986/1987 when there were 259 Indonesian students studying in Taiwan. Since then, the number of Indonesian students has fluctuated between 200 and 250 students from 1986 until 1993. The number increased from 249 in 1993 to 368 in 1994. After that, there was an increase in Indonesian student numbers, reaching more than 1,000 in 1998. However, it decreased from the 2002/2003 school year, but after the 2003/2004 school year, the number of Indonesian students

in Taiwan showed a rapid increase. Based on TETO statistics, as of 2017, 5,074 Indonesian students were studying in Taiwan, including 3,131 degree students at the bachelor, master and doctoral level, 317 exchange students and 1,626 students studying Mandarin.

Table 2.1 Statistics of Indonesian students in Taiwan school year 1986-2016

School Year	Total student
1986/1987	259
1987/1988	291
1988/1989	217
1989/1990	214
1990/1991	211
1991/1992	208
1992/1993	245
1993/1994	249
1994/1995	368
1995/1996	335
1996/1997	380
1997/1998	382
1998/1999	579

1999/2000	1685
2000/2001	2174
2001/2002	1158
2002/2003	961
2003/2004	1002
2004/2005	1391
2005/2006	1494
2006/2007	1555
2008/2009	1658
2010/2011	2881
2011/2012	2575
2012/2013	2901
2013/2014	3186
2014/2015	3559
2015/2016	4394
2016/2017	5074
Total	41586

Source: Statistical Summaries provided by the Ministry of Education, ROC Taiwan for International Symposium of PPI Taiwan 2017, Master Thesis of Kabinawa (2013) and Taiwan Economic and Trade Office (TETO) in Jakarta

From the statistics above and supported by Ma's research findings, we can draw several conclusions. Firstly, the number of Indonesian students in Taiwan from 1986 until 1999 was not significant because ranged between 200 to 400 only due to the Taiwan government education policy which focused on benefiting Taiwanese as the requirements for overseas Chinese student enrollment was tightened. In addition, at this time, Taiwan did not place the recruitment of foreign students as an integral component of its education policy. As a result, no Indonesian indigenous students were studying in Taiwan at that time. From 1998 to 2000, the number of Indonesian students in Taiwan number increased due to several factors. The year 1998 saw Indonesia in political turmoil that put ethnic Chinese in the country in a disadvantageous position, causing many to flee the country and send their children to study abroad. One of the destinations available for Chinese at that time was Taiwan. In addition, Taiwan also willingly accepted these Chinese. Furthermore, at that time, Taiwan was implementing its first "Southward Policy" that aimed to increase Taiwanese investment in Indonesia. This policy would open more job opportunities and require Indonesians to demonstrate Chinese linguistic ability and familiarity with Taiwanese customs. The year 2000 marked the first time indigenous Indonesian students studied in Taiwan due to the Taiwan government policy shift to start recruiting foreign students. The decrease in Indonesian student numbers during the 2002/2003 academic year (the only case when Indonesian student numbers fell below 1,000 from 1999 until 2017) may have been due to Taiwan's political situation at that time. That year followed the 2000 election and saw the opposition party take power for the first time in 2001. The significant growth in the number of Indonesian students after 2011 is generated by the intensified cooperation between the Indonesia and Taiwan governments. In addition, Indonesians obtained more information about Taiwan and learned about the opportunity to study in Taiwan. At the same time, Taiwan realizes that their soft power through education would enhance their presence in international society so they developed several policies to favor international students. Furthermore, the New Southbound policy initiated by the government of President Tsai Ing-wen has had big contributions to increasing Indonesian student numbers from 2016.

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CENTRAL ASIA SECURITY IMPLICATIONS TO XINJIANG

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Abstract

This article explains the security of the Central Asian region which has implications for the security of Xinjiang. The Central Asian region, which borders Xinjiang directly, makes it easier for China to obtain sources of raw materials as well as markets for China. However, Central Asia that homes to Uyghurs have unstable security because of the extremists and terrorists. It contributes to the unstable security of Xinjiang because of the Uyghur separatists. Therefore, this article used the regional security complex theory to explain this phenomenon. The findings of this article are that China securitizes this issue that separatism, terrorism, and extremism are common threats to China and the Central Asian region through formed the institutions of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Keywords

China; Xinjiang; Central Asia; SCO; Regional Security Complex

INTRODUCTION

Xinjiang is inhabited by a diverse ethnic group consisting of Han, Hui, Kazak, and ethnic Uighurs¹ as the majority ethnic group with Islam being the majority religion in the region. This area is about one-sixth of the total area of China. Before joining China, this region had proclaimed its independence twice, the first in 1933-1934 and the second in 1944-1949 with the official name was the East Turkestan Republic. Unfortunately, despite this new state component, it failed to get diplomatic recognition as a sovereign state. When we trace the history back, we can say that Xinjiang is a region with unstable security. Xinjiang's domestic situation is also influenced by countries around the region, for example, the Soviet Union. Between Xinjiang and the Soviet Union has established close trade relations. With the trade, the ethnic Uighurs in the region of the former Soviet Union spread to Xinjiang. However, this also led to rebellion and inter-ethnic conflict in Xinjiang. It matters because since the Qing fell, Xinjiang was controlled under the authoritarian government. Uighurs are dominant in terms of number, but the government authorities at the time, sought to increase the dominance of ethnic Han by opening the immigration door to Xinjiang and they were not required to pay tax land, while Uighurs were forced to move from their land. The conditions turned out to foster a sense of Turkish nationalism among the population of Xinjiang and the Muslim Turkey which raises the separatist group in Xinjiang region.

For China itself, Xinjiang is a strategic area (Panda, 2006, pp. 30-33). Firstly, Xinjiang has large reserves of natural resources; secondly,

¹ Uighur is people who speak Turkish and live in South Xinjiang.

Xinjiang has fertile land which is potential for agriculture; thirdly, Xinjiang has potential in the textile industry, and finally, the most important thing is that Xinjiang adjacent with Central Asian countries that becomes a way for China to strengthen the trade with countries in Europe. Like two sides of a coin, Xinjiang also opens the possibility to worsen security in the country as well as in the region. Given that Central Asia is home to the Uighurs and a place for developing Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist groups, therefore, this paper will attempt to explain the Xinjiang security issues related to security in the Central Asia region.

REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX THEORY

The theory is developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver which departs from security issues. Therefore, Buzan and Waever define security as a condition in which there is a threat to the survival of an object that is claimed to have the right to life (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 71). In their writing, Buzan and Waever claim that the theories they develop use constructivist perspectives because Buzan and Waever focus on three important things: what conditions, whose security, and what issues (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 71). In their theory, Buzan and Waever state that security threats only cover short distances. According to Buzan, the world is divided into regions and power, so the threat will only affect relations between neighbors. Thus, this is called the Regional Security Complex where there are units that carry out securitization, desecuritization, or both are interrelated so that their security problems cannot be analyzed or resolved separately from one another (Buzan, Kelstrup, Lemaitr, Tromer & Waever, 1990, p.13). Buzan and Waever also emphasize that not every region or group of

countries can be classified as a regional security complex. The most important thing, according to Buzan and Waeber, is to have interdependence in its solution.

Considering the geographical location of Xinjiang which is close to countries in Central Asia, the regional security complex theory will be used to explain the security situation in Xinjiang related to security in Central Asia. Finally, the security situation in Central Asia has to be explained in analysis of security issues in Xinjiang. Even though Xinjiang is not included in the Central Asia region, its security will have implications to Xinjiang.

SECURITY: XINJIANG AND CENTRAL ASIA

Relation between China and Central Asia is currently driven by geographical, political, economic and security factors. In terms of geography, China and Central Asia have direct borders. Central Asia is a bridge for China to build relations with Europe and West Asia. In addition, in terms of politics, China and Central Asia have a mutually beneficial relationship, such as the numbers of cooperation that is established both bilateral and multilateral. In terms of economy, China and Central Asia need each other as an effort to spur their respective economies. Central Asia is a source of Chinese energy supply and a market for Chinese industrial products. At the same time, China is a place for Central Asia to sell raw materials for Chinese industrial products. Finally, in terms of security, China and Central Asia have similar problems to solve, such as the threat of transnational crime, terrorism, extremism and separatism. This security issue is the main driver for China to foster relations with Central Asia.

Disarmament at the border was the first security issues discussed between China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia. This negotiation lasted for three years, from 1992 to 1995 with 22 rounds. The result of this negotiation was a Confidence Building Agreement signed by five presidents on April 26, 1996. Under the agreement, the five countries pledged to take an important step in increasing trust along the border area controlled by military forces. In addition, this agreement aims to promote peace and stability along the borders of China and four other countries. This agreement later became the beginning of the formation of more complex regional security cooperation.

The negotiations above regarding border security show a critical issue for China because Xinjiang is a strategic area that must be protected. The security issues of Xinjiang and Central Asia have a reciprocal relationship: if Central Asian security is controlled, then Xinjiang's security will be controlled as well and vice versa. Therefore, ethnic background similarities between Central Asia and Xinjiang are also one of the Chinese concerns. The solidarity of Uighur ethnic groups living in Central Asia can strengthen the desire of Uighurs in Xinjiang to carry out separatist efforts against China. Moreover, Central Asia is also a place for nesting and developing groups of "Islamic fundamentalism" and international terrorist networks. Some of these groups carried out peaceful activities, such as Salafis, Jamiat-e Tabliq, and Hizb ut-Tahrir, but there were also those who used violence - which is often referred to as "Islamic militant" groups that could develop into terrorist organizations such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) which emerged in the Ferghana and Tajikistan valleys (Lang, 2003, pp 7-8). Both groups want to form an integrated Islamic state in Central Asia. This condition also makes

the group become very easy to develop and spread in the region. It is feared that the group supplies weapons and explosives to various separatist groups in Xinjiang, such as the United Revolutionary Front of Eastern Turkestan (URFET), Xinjiang Liberation Organization (XLO), Uighur The Liberation Organization (ULO), the Wolves of Lop Nor, the Free Turkistan Movement, the Home of the East Turkistan Youth, the Organization for the Liberation of Uighuristan, and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) (Ong, 2005, p.429). All of these groups have been labelled by China as separatist groups and also terrorists. On several occasions, the Xinjiang police succeeded in thwarting arms smuggling from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang through Khorgos Pass (Schicor, 2008, p.62). The URFET separatist group was founded by Yusupbek Mukhlisi or known as Modan Mukhlisi. The group claims to have more than 30 armed units in and around the Xinjiang region. Initially, the group resisted peacefully, but in March 1997 the URFET stated that it would take up arms against Chinese oppression (McNeal, 2001, p. 9). The Xinjiang Liberation Organization and the Uighur Liberation Organization were reportedly active in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The two groups are claimed to be responsible for the killing of Uighurs whom they see as the accomplices of the Chinese government and the Central Asian state government.

Wolves of Lop Nor has a base in the city of Lop Nor, Xinjiang. The group also issued a statement on Taiwan radio stations about a series of attacks carried out as a response to the Chinese government's oppression of pro-independence Uighur activists. The Free Turkistan Movement group has carried out a rebellion in the city of Baren, Xinjiang. In that incident, the Chinese government officially reported

that 22 people had been killed. China also claimed that the weapons used in this event were from the Afghan Mujahideen group. Home of East Turkistan Youth is a radical group that fought through violence against the oppression of the Chinese government in Xinjiang. The group is estimated to have more than 2,000 members who have participated in training in making explosives in Afghan regional camps. Later, the Organization for the Liberation of the Uighurs held that China had occupied the territory of the Uighurs. Similar to other groups, OLF also fought against the Chinese government through violence. Finally, separatist groups who named themselves East Turkistan Independence Movement (ETIM) were the main enemies of the Chinese government. This group received financial support, advice and training from Al-Qaeda international terrorists. This will help and strengthen these separatist groups in achieving their goals to form a sovereign state.

These separatist groups flourished when Deng Xiaoping's government began to spur economic growth which had fallen during Mao's time. Deng began to expand trade routes to the Central Asia region. In addition, Deng also encouraged the Xinjiang Muslim group to build relationships with fellow believers in Central Asia. In this period, the Uighurs are allowed to travel related to religion and culture to Islamic countries. Deng's policy has both positive and negative effects. It is clear that the positive effects of this policy will increase the growth of the Chinese economy, but there are also negative effects in the form of opening up opportunities for the development of separatist groups in Xinjiang. This condition has encouraged China to deepen relations with Central Asia, considering that Xinjiang's security will affect China's energy supply and trade to Central Asia.

SHANGHAI COOPERATION AS SECURITIZATION FORM OF XINJIANG SECURITY

The Shanghai Five is a multilateral forum in the region. The organization was established in 1996 as a security partnership initiated by China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. The organization aims to strengthen regional boundaries and seek agreement for disarmament, promote regional stability and peace, and strengthen economic cooperation (Sun, 2007, p.55). With Uzbekistan's accession in 2001, the Shanghai Five transformed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organizations (SCO). At the moment, SCO officially has eight members states with India and Pakistan as additional members. Through the SCO, China also introduced the principle of security cooperation among members, namely against three evils: terrorists, separatists and religious extremists (HRW, 2006). As stated by President Hu Jintao, the efforts made must be aimed to avoid regional confrontation and poverty which are seen as the roots of terrorism (Davis, 2008, p.18). Hu Jintao's statement was true because all SCO members experienced the same security problems related to these three evils, such as China facing terrorism threats from East Turkestan seeking to carry out separatists from China, while Russia was threatened by Chechen separatists who did terrorist attacks, as well as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan threatened by the Islamic Renewal Party, the Uzbekistan Islamic Movement, and other extremist and terrorist groups. These three evils also directly threaten the relations of countries unity in the region as well as economic and social stability (Kerr & Laura, 2008, p. 130).

Until now, the doctrine of three evils has become the basis of every action of SCO member countries in creating stability in domestic and regional security. China plays an important role in initiating and planting the doctrine of three evils. China is intensely using "terror" as its diplomatic agenda, especially in international cooperation after the terrorist attacks on September 11. In this regard, China then positions the issue of separatists in Xinjiang as an act of terrorism that has the potential to disrupt the stability of regional security. This is done by framing the problem through the doctrine of three evils so that Central Asian countries must take part in overcoming the problem of separatism in Xinjiang. Therefore, the Shanghai Convention Against Extremists, Separatists, and Terrorists, called on member countries to cooperate in carrying out actions to identify, prevent and fight against actions carried out by groups considered to be three evils in the region. This idea is stated in article 6 of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism Separatism and Extremism. The article explains that the joined countries must fight all forms of three evils activities, but also show that each member country is a partner of this cooperation so that it requires them to coordinate with one another. This condition indicates that the activity of three evils is cross-border, thus, it requires a formal framework to legalize the activity of a country in operations outside its territory.

In addition, China continued to campaign the idea of fighting the three evils as common interest in the SCO. This was seen at the SCO meeting located in Tashkent in 2004 which invites SCO member countries to make an effort to fight terrorism and create regional peace and stability for the sake of economic growth. China, through President Hu, also stated that all forms of terrorism must be suppressed and a

double standard in combating terrorism is considered a threat to world peace (Xinhua, 2004). China and the Central Asian countries through the SCO have agreed to fight the threat originating from three evils. China classifies separatist movements in Xinjiang, especially those who want to establish the East Turkistan state, as a terrorist movement. Central Asian countries that have committed to fighting against terrorism with China through SCO, in Hu's view, should not show an attitude of supporting, assisting or establishing relations with separatist groups in Xinjiang. The attitude of Central Asian countries must be clear, namely to fight and condemn acts of terror carried out by Uyghur separatists. The statement does not allow double standards to be proven by China through pressure on SCO member countries, especially Central Asian countries, to break the chain of relations between Uyghur separatists in their countries. The Chinese call was responded by the governments of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan by imposing a ban on Uyghur political parties and all forms of publications that smelled of confrontation with the government (Azizian, 2005, pp. 6-9). The actions of the governments of these countries reflect support for China in fighting Uyghur separatists.

As a form of implementation of the Shanghai Convention, SCO forms a RATS (Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure). Indirectly, RATS is a form of recognition of the "three devils" action in Central Asia which is part of a regional problem that requires a regional response as well (Aris, 2009, p.469). China is a main driven actor in the process of opening RATS, as expressed by President Hu at the SCO Summit 2003 that the establishment of RATS is the top priority of SCO and SCO members must be able to ensure that RATS can operate as soon as

possible. This indicates that China has a role in determining the direction of SCO. China uses regional security reasons in forming RATS which indirectly accommodates national interests regarding its domestic security. The RATS serves as a forum for SCO member countries to coordinate and collect information about terrorism in the region and maintain security intelligence data that is only open to SCO member countries.

The RATS is also a platform to conduct research regarding networks and methods of terrorism. The results of this analysis will be given to the country concerned and allow the country to coordinate at the domestic level and with other countries in the region. As expressed by a senior official in the Department of European and Central Asian Relations of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in an interview with Stephen Aris that the performance of RATS was very good and achieved significant results (Aris, p.470). This is proven during two years of operation, RATS has recorded 400 people who are members of terrorist organizations, then put 14 terrorist organizations into blacklists such as the Islamic Party of Turkestan, the Taliban, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Al-Jihad, and others. RATS also successfully prevented 250 terrorist attacks in SCO member areas, including Xinjiang (UzReport, 2006). This shows that RATS indirectly benefits China. With coordination and assistance from SCO member countries, terrorist attacks that pose a threat to the stability of security in Xinjiang can be prevented. In addition, this also shows that SCO member countries play an important role in maintaining stability in Xinjiang. To further encourage RATS performance, China also provided funding of 24% of the total budget (Kirchner & Dominguez, 2013, p.259). The amount of money paid by China was greater than the other four member countries. The RATS is

one of the successful forms of China in making the issue of three evils as a common problem. Another advantage gained by China is the sense of responsibility held by SCO member countries to maintain security stability in Xinjiang. In addition, it is not only prevention but China can also request assistance to locate individuals who carry out actions related to separatism, terrorism and extremism based on Article 6 points 8 of the RATS Agreement. In addition, China also has the ability to continue creating regulations and rules that benefit the country in an effort to reduce separatism in Xinjiang. The function of RATS in making proposals and recommendations against separatism, terrorism and extremism is based on the request of SCO member countries and in accordance with points 1, 2, 5 and 6 of Article 6 of the RATS Agreement. Through this article, it legitimizes China to be able to implement rules that can secure the Xinjiang region. As a central actor in SCO, China has the ability to determine the forms of regulation formulated in the RATS. When linked to the Xinjiang problem, the RATS is an institution that provides space for China to coordinate with SCO member countries that have a network of Uyghur separatist groups in their territory. China can request information and prepare operations with other SCO member countries to secure the Xinjiang region which is packed in regional interests.

CONCLUSION

Xinjiang that borders with countries in Central Asia raises security issues of reciprocity. This can be seen from the development of a group of separatists, extremists and terrorists in Central Asia which raises China's concern, considering that Xinjiang seeks to separate itself from China that leads to terrorism. To solve this problem, China

constructs the idea that separatist, terrorist, and extremist are common threat, which are called three evils, and it must be resolved together. This idea was then realized through the Shanghai Convention and RATS as part of the SCO institution.

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IS PARTICIPATION OF ISRAELI WOMEN IN THE PEACE PROCESS POTENTIALLY SOLVING THE WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PALESTINE?

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Abstract

This article aims to elaborate Israeli women participation in the peace process of Israel and Palestine on philosophical theory. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has lasted a long time and is still far from peace. Several attempts have been made such as the birth of several peace resolutions but they have not yet produced results. In the peace process women are seen as playing an important role, this is also recognized globally by the United Nations. In the philosophical view regarding women and peace there are two traditions of thinking, the first is Mother Moral and the second is social construction. This paper finds that Israeli women's participation in the peace process has the potential to stop the Israeli-Palestinian war. This is not due to the outward nature of women who love peace or because women were created anti-war, but this is due to social construction in Israeli society that positions women as second class, causing women to be closer to peace than men.

Keywords

humanitarian assistance; state behavior; social capital

INTRODUCTION

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict which lasted for many years has become a mainstream issue (subject matter) among international science study participants, especially for those who take the Middle East region specifications. The conflict between these two entities then became increasingly complex due to interference from several parties both from Arab countries and also western countries such as the United States that supported Israel. In addition to the complexity of the actors involved, this conflict is important because of the contested land, Jerusalem, which is a historic and sacred place for the three world divine religions (Jews, Christians, and Muslims). Some peace negotiations have been carried out by the United Nations and also by the United States and Arab countries, but the peace process between these two entities from 1967 to the present is still experiencing obstacles.

In the peace process, Israeli women have participated since 1977 with the formation of the Peace Now movement which is active until now. Globally the role of women in conflict resolution began to be recognized in 2000 when the UN Security Council resolution 1325 was issued on women, peace, and security adopted on October 31, 2000. The Israeli state also implemented this UN Security Council resolution, on July 20, 2005, the Knesset passed the law. The law relating to "equality for women's rights" which declares that the need for women's representation in each sector in the government committee at the national level (Lion Finkel, 2012). The emergence of Israeli women's participation in the peace process then raises questions for the author, whether the participation of Israeli women in the Israeli-Palestinian

peace process has the potential to stop war or conflict between the two entities?

What is meant by women's participation in the peace process in this paper is the participation of Israeli women as peacemakers as explained by Joyce P. Kaufman and Christian P. Williams (2013) in their article entitled *Women at War: Women Building Peace: Challenging Gender Norms*. There are two forms of women's participation as peacemakers, namely through formal politics (in government) and through non-formal politics (women's peace movements and organizations) (Kaufman, William, 2013).

FOUNDATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY

There are two traditions of philosophical thought concerning the relationship between women and peace. The first tradition is called *Mother Moral*, which is a terminology used by American feminists who refer to philosophical constructs that emphasize feminist beliefs that women in a natural way love peace or pacifism and naturally do not like any form of attack (Elshstain, 2013). Whereas the second tradition of thinking is the criticism of Elshstain's assumption that in general women are peace-loving beings. This view believes that the inherent character of women is not outwardly but social/social construction (Tickener, 1992).

- Moral Mother

This thought was conveyed by Jean Bethke Elshstain, a political philosopher, who represented the view that women from birth were created as pacifists (love for peace) while men as warmongering

(warmongers). They believe that women as mothers aim to reform hostile men, this is based on women's closeness to nature and their responsibilities in human reproduction. A Good war is a result that arises due to a conflict in an antagonistic world and a country that does not trust each other, or is a continuation of the country's political efforts, in this view war is essentially a mistake of men. They are considered experiencing confusion in distinguishing violence (power) from power (power) so that politics can be saved from war only by the Moral Mother. The socialization experienced by women has historically increased their role as care-givers and carers are the reason why women tend to be pacifist (loving peace)(Elshstain, 2013).

The image of the Moral Mother is contrary to the image of men as Just Warrior, women have a nurturing, compassionate and politically correct nature, and women are also spokespersons for all fragile or vulnerable living things. Jean Bethé Elstain argues that women are naturally and culturally superior to men in terms of peace, and war will only produce a world based on gender dichotomy and power hierarchy (Elshstain, 2013).

- *Social construction*

This tradition of thought believes that the relationship between women and peace is due to their exclusion and marginalization from the public sphere and from war, rather than due to biological nature or their experience as a mother or care-givers. Not only were they excluded from formal politics but also the fact that women were forced to participate in wars which they themselves disagreed with. One figure who believes in this view is Ann Tickner who stated that:

“The association of femininity with peace lend support to an idealized masculinity that depends on constructing women as passive victims in need of protection. It also contributes to the claim that women are naive in matters relating to international politics. An enriched, less militarized notion of citizenship cannot be built on such a weak foundation (J. Ann Tickener, 1992).

Social construction which later formed women as passive, weak and must be protected actors made women marginalized in developing state affairs. This is because the state must not be built on a weak foundation. The marginalization of women from state affairs and power makes women far from war because war is an effort to exercise power.

Another figure with the same thought is Galtung who sees differences in men and women in a gender context, namely as a line that separates people into two different categories, male and female. For Galtung gender is a property of individuals and is a space where violence/conflict occur. Gender is a behavior that is socially studied and is a hope that separates masculinity and femininity. At this time we live in a gender-oriented world, where quality related to masculinity (rationality, ambition and strength) is given a higher value and status than quality associated with femininity (emotions, passivity, weakness), which is then called feminists as a gender hierarchy, namely a system of power in which the nature of men is given privileges compared to the nature of femininity (Confortini, 2006)

DISCUSSION

This paper argues that for the Israeli context, women's participation in the peace process has the potential to stop the Israeli-Palestinian war. This is not due to the outward nature of women who love peace or because women are created anti-war, but this is due to

social construction in Israeli society that positions women as second class, causing women to be closer to peace than men.

The Moral Mother's view based on the innate nature of peace-loving women is not in accordance with the Israeli context. This is because Israel has the certain number of women involved in the military sector. Women's participation in violence or the military certainly contradicts the Moral Mother's view that women are outwardly anti-violence and love peace. Therefore the author prefers the second thought which states that women's relationship with peace is not formed outwardly but is a result of the social construction of the society that positions women as the second class. The following are some of the authors' arguments regarding the social construction of Israeli society which caused the tendency of Israeli women to peace.

The first social construction that influenced gender relations in Israel originated from the history of the formation of the state of Israel. Theodore Herzl in his article *Altneuland* in 1990 presented the doctrine of the New Jew which later became the ideology and vision of the Zionist movement (Klein, 2000). The doctrine aims to produce a new Jew or New Jew in the Zionist movement, namely the view to change the Jewish nation that once seemed weak and did not rely on physical strength to be a strong and feared figure.

The New Jew's identity planting made the position of women increasingly disadvantaged in Israeli society. The initial orientation of the Israeli state demanded that the Jews rely more on physical strength, making women who were physically weaker than men then not playing an important role.

Another thing that also shapes gender in Israel is the prolonged war that Israel has faced since the beginning of the country's

establishment. The war resulted in Israeli life being Military Centric (military as the main sector), where the military was a field dominated by men (Klein, 2000). The condition of the state of Israel which considers the existence of the military as important as the beginning of the state has an impact on the views of Israeli society who consider that the way to serve the country is through participating in war and joining the military.

The centrality of the military in Israeli social life has an impact on discrimination for women in the political field. Since the establishment of the state of Israel, the percentage of women's involvement in the Knesset has never reached 10%. Only 52 women had been councilors (until 1992) and only 5 of them were oriental Jews born in Arab countries. This is due to the conversion of rankings in the military into rankings in political parties, in other words, a military background is very much needed and is considered as the main prerequisite for joining the government in Israel. The impact of this conversion is that the political realm in Israel is dominated by masculine, as evidenced by the data which states that in the past ten or 15 years the generals who retired at the age of 40 later switched professions from military services to politicians.

The dominance of men not only reaches the political sphere, but it also has an impact on negotiating the peace process between Israel and Palestine. In peace negotiations between Israel and Arab countries, representatives sent by Israel are senior soldiers, senior duty officers, and top echelons, wherein the three sectors the contribution of women is still nil.

In addition to the historical factors of the formation of an Israeli state which was overwhelmed by war and military centrism in Israel and the existence of the New Jew doctrine, another factor that is not less important in constructing gender in Israel is the Jewish religion. One phenomenon related to the Jewish tradition and the involvement of women in politics is the understanding of Israeli religious parties (Orthodox Jews) that "A woman's honor is in her house". This understanding certainly contradicts women's participation in politics and government. Orthodox Jews account for 25% of Israel's population and get around 15% of seats in the Knesset. One member of the Orthodox Knesset who was the head of the finance committee at the Knesset, even suggested in his speech to reject voting rights for women. One of the more moderate national religious parties (Israel religious parties) sometimes accepts the symbolic representation of women, but as stated by Brichta and Brichta (1994) it is very difficult to expect that an Orthodox Jew who prays every day "Blessed be He that did not make me a woman" will support the election of women to join the Knesset. (Brichta, 1994)

The three forms of social construction above cause women's participation in politics and government in the country of Israel is still low when compared to other democratic countries. This is in line with a statement from an Israeli peace activist, Petta Jones Pellach, in her interview with the author on Friday, May 26, 2017. She stated that: "the thing is political, women are not represented enough. Those who are going to politics often behave like a man"(based on the interview with Petta Jones Pellach on 26 Mei 2017)

CONCLUSION

Based on the previous explanation concerning male domination in the social construction of Israeli society, the authors conclude that Israeli women's participation in the peace process has the potential to stop the Israeli-Palestinian war if carried out through grassroots movements and non-governmental peace organizations, not through participation in formal politics. Because then Israeli women can freely contribute to the realization of peace between Israel and Palestine without having to face the domination and discrimination of the Israeli masculine.

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CIVIL SOCIETY, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

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Abstract

The engagement of civil society in global governance can be a problem-solving for varied issues in globalisation era. Unfortunately, civil society faces challenges from the concept of political representation. It struggles to gain status as a “legitimate representation” of people and receives criticism from many scholars related to issue of accountability, transparency, and legitimacy. This chapter analyses the problems of civil society to fit into political representation framework and also the solutions to overcome them. Global civil society, however, offers new idea and concept to be a proper representative of the public.

Keywords

civil society; global governance; legitimacy; accountability; transparency; representation

INTRODUCTION

Civil society emerges as one of the most important actors in global governance. Throughout history, civil society has played a significant role to trigger development and advancement in various sectors such as economic, political, and social. It works together with other actors in global sphere to solve world issues such as human rights, development, government transparency, and migration (World Economic Forum, 2017). There are a large number of civil societies in the world today. In the United States, there are around 1.5 million Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) working as representatives of people. They primarily deal with assorted problems and contribute to solutions through new and different problem-solving approaches (Humanrights, 2016). The novelty of the civil society concept creates different innovations in global governance.

The position of civil society in global governance, however, has undergone some major problems. The concept of political representation, rooted in Westphalian framework, sees global civil society as improper representatives of people. Hudson (2001: 337) also emphasises that most NGOs have problems with issues of representation and accountability. Therefore, civil society cannot rely on a political representation concept to operate in global governance if it intends to be recognised as a legitimate actor. It needs to bring in new standards and criteria of proper representation. This is one of the reasons why civil society challenges traditional ideas of political representation.

The chapter consists of four major sections. In the first section, I summarise methodology of the research and also the engagement of

civil society in global governance with its empirical evidence. It aims to give a brief explanation of how civil society works within a global sphere. The next sections are followed by a discussion about issues of representativeness, accountability, transparency, and legitimacy. I compare both concepts of traditional political representation and civil society and also demonstrate the clashes between them. The last section explores several actions and solutions for civil society to deal with accountability, transparency, and legitimacy issues.

METHODOLOGY

This research is conducted using qualitative research method. Most of data for this paper are taken from books, academic journals, official documents, and websites. These sources are considered as public archives. This type of source has become a popular one for many researchers due to its efficiency and effectiveness in process of collecting and analysing the data (Berg, 2007: 242). In short, this paper attempts to answer the question why civil society needs to challenge the ideas of political representation.

ENGAGEMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

A discussion of civil society cannot be ignored when it comes to the concept of today's modern global system. As pointed out by Kaldor, many different actors play a role in the global system, such as members of public and private sectors, states, and international organisations

(2003b: 583). Scholte (2011: 10) also supports this view as he emphasises that non-state actors also have important positions in global governance. It is definitely a diverse atmosphere since this global system includes different level of governance as well, moving from the local to global level (Scholte, 2002: 288). These arguments clarify that states alongside other non-state actors, work together and cooperate under one sphere called global governance.

Global or transnational civil society acts as one of the significant players in a global system. A civil society is formed by individuals in society (Kaldor, 2003b: 585). Today, several civil society groups have been transformed into bigger institutions. Florini (in Price, 2003: 580) refers to it as “transnational civil society” because it does not merely involve local or national issues but has the capability to reach a global level. Both Kaldor (2003: 588) and Scholte (2011: 10) agree that transnational civil society deals with various subjects such as environment, poverty, gender, healthcare, and education. Their wide contribution to global governance should be taken into account.

Global governance is able to influence state and non-state actors and vice versa (Scholte, 2011: 10). The state is not the only actor with power on this level since the others are also capable of taking an active role. Relationships among players in global governance can be an alternative means to solve various problems affecting the world. There are many established examples of collaboration between civil society and states or international organisations. One is the engagement of civil society with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations (UN). More than 4,000 NGOs have consultative status with ECOSOC today (UN Department of Economics and Social Affairs, n.d.). With this status, these NGOs will be able to express their concern

and points of view and have more opportunities to lobby and interact with other institutions (United Nations, 2011). This platform is a good opportunity for NGOs to transfer their ideas and concepts, which can be considered and executed by the UN based on member consensus. NGOs, as one form of civil society, can engage in real participation through this collaboration. Furthermore, I argue that both parties benefit from this because NGOs have a medium to channel their interests and the UN receives expertise and knowledge from this civil society. To improve global governance, both actors should enhance the quality of this interaction and keep it sustainable despite of many different obstacles.

The engagement of civil society in global governance gives fresh insight and different approaches to how a global system should work. However, their existence encounters some challenges from an old concept of international politics. Some scholars see them as a new movement that does not fit in a formal system of global governance. To clarify these issues, the next sections will discuss what obstacles are faced by modern civil society and strategies they use to overcome them.

Issue of representativeness

The existence of global civil society and its legitimacy have been questioned by some scholars since they are seen as an incompatible representation of people. Edwards (in Kaldor, 2003a: 6) argues that “they are not representative and do not claim to be representative”. Civil society does not fulfil the “requirement” based on traditional ideas of political representation. This old concept is mostly derived from a Westphalian framework acknowledging the state as the only legitimate

and accountable actor to exist at a global level (Collingwood & Logister, 2005: 176; Scholte, 2011: 18). From this perspective, civil society will have no place to engage in global governance. This situation, I argue, leads them to set a new standard and challenges the traditional idea of political representation.

The issue of representativeness is one aspect of civil society that does not fit in a political representation conceptual framework. Hanna Pitkin, a well-known political scientist, argues that a representative should be one who is elected by the populace and has expertise in the field of politics (1967: 219). This argument implies that voting is a significant way to decide who will represent people's interest. In 1774, E. Burke, in his speech to Bristol citizens, stressed the importance of relations between representatives and their constituents since representatives are chosen by a majority of citizens (Oxford Text Archive, n.d.). Hanna and Burke agreed that voters should have a voice when it comes to electing representatives. Their voice needs to be taken into account.

This concept, however, contradicts civil society's position, whether in global governance or on a national level. Civil society is not elected by the people; Saward (2009: 3) called it a "non-elective representative". He suggests that this non-elective representative can be an alternative medium to represent people's needs. In a globalisation era, there are various challenges faced by states—especially related to the global sphere—which at times cannot be resolved. This is one of the reasons why global governance exists and transnational civil society takes the action (Scholte, 2002: 287). Furthermore, Bagchi claims that representatives do not have to be elected provided they can work effectively and voice the interests of people they represent (in Saward,

2009: 17). These arguments support civil society as an institution claiming to represent society without public election, which is the traditional concept of political representation.

Sovereignty and territory also become concerns in representativeness issues. Rehfeld (2005: 4) says that the view of representation in many democratic states relates to a territorial concept of where constituents reside. He provides an example of the U.S. House of Representatives, which uses a territorial representation pattern. Even though the representatives do not only represent the people in their area, the concept of district, area, or region still exists as an aspect of political representation (Bailey, 1835: 137). This relates to a sovereignty framework in the Westphalian model, as I mentioned earlier, where the only acceptable actor in global governance is the state, which consists of territory and borders along with its representation.

Civil societies, especially transnational ones which work across nations, emerge and challenge the sovereignty concept in political representation. At times it is seen as “threat” to a state since civil society possesses enough power in global governance to influence the decision-making process (Hudson, 2001: 334; Saward, 2009: 13). Moreover, it does not even use a standard of the Westphalian concept regarding territory and sovereignty because it brings a new framework to global governance. Scholte (2002: 286) approves this novel idea and he emphasises that the globalisation era no longer focuses on problems of borders and territories since business activity and communication across nations have eliminated this boundary. Nowadays, most political and social phenomena also occur in the global sphere (Bartelston, 2006: 386).

In fact, civil society does not even try to take over state power, but attempts to provide new ways to represent people's voices. Saward (2009: 22) argues that state formal elections cannot cover citizens' interest, which then provides an opportunity for non-elective representation, such as NGOs and other forms of civil society, to take action. The emergence of civil society will assist a state and help solve the problem of unequal representation.

In a state, there are many different societal interests represented in the public sphere. The representatives consider the interests of citizens as a whole, not just groups of people or a single perspective (Bailey, 1835: 137). They always try to ensure that those voices are not overlooked. On the other hand, civil society represents certain interests. Each organisation attempts to pursue its aims and goals by focusing on particular issues (Kaldor, 2003b: 588; Scholte, 2002: 288). For instance, Friends of the Earth, a civil society organisation which has been active for more than 40 years, works with issues of environmental protection and nature (Friends of the Earth, n.d.). It does not concern itself with other sectors since its only interest is the environment. This representation of a single interest becomes another clash between traditional political representation and the civil society concept.

Friends of the Earth, like other civil society organisations, has never been elected to represent environmental interests; nevertheless, it has expanded its networks successfully all over the world and established Friends of the Earth International with 76 institutions as members. Recently, Friends of the Earth Indonesia and other environmental groups won a court battle against the Indonesian government. The government was found guilty in the case of forest fires in 2015 (Friends of the Earth, 2017). Indeed, there are many problems

that cannot be resolved by government, especially when its member involves in the case as a perpetrator. Even though Friends of the Earth cannot fit into a category set by the Westphalian framework and political representation, I argue that it still exists as a representative of the people and helps find solutions for environmental problems.

Issue of accountability, transparency, and legitimacy

In general, accountability, transparency, and legitimacy are three characteristics that should be met by a representative. Civil society, which by nature is different from a state, also needs to have those three aspects. Scholars like Kaldor, Saward, Hudson, and Collingwood try to build a discourse of civil society which can take an active role in global governance and become transparent, legitimate, and accountable to those who are represented.

Scholte (2011: 16) states that accountability can be defined as “a condition and process whereby an actor answers for its conduct to those whom it affects”. Political representatives should be accountable to the people they represent (Pitkin, 1967: 11). They should be wise and considerate while making decisions since people trust and rely on them. In a governmental system, it is not difficult to decide who representatives should be accountable to, since citizens elect them. Civil society is an entirely different case. It cannot follow the same pattern of accountability determined by a political representation framework. Civil society has a complex process of accountability because it is not elected and it does not have a constituency. Hudson (2001: 339) says that a civil society becomes uncertain when it comes to deciding which actor it should be accountable to. Kaldor (2003a: 12) argues that this

problem arises because a civil society organisation must be accountable and responsible to different groups of people, such as donors, internal structures, and the public. Donors provide funding for civil society's activities, internal structure systems keeps the civil society working, and the public is people represented by a civil society.

Issues of accountability in a globalisation era cannot be addressed through the Westphalian framework because it regards the state as the only legitimate body on an international level (Scholte, 2011: 18). Meanwhile, there are many activities occurring across borders and continents within a global governance sphere. It is unlikely for the state to be accountable for all of them because other actors, such as international organisations and global civil society, also engage in those activities. Therefore, transnational civil society should lay new groundwork of accountability to properly represent people in global governance.

Accountability is strongly related to transparency since it is one aspect that constitutes whether an institution is accountable or not (Scholte, 2011: 16). A state also needs to be transparent to the public. In most democratic countries, transparency has become a significant method to publicise government activity. For example, in the United Kingdom and Canada, every political party needs to report funds or donations it receives (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2007: 311). The financial aspect is one of the important points in transparency either for the state or civil society.

Civil society organisations employ different modes of transparency. Transnational civil societies cannot follow strict and fixed rules of how to be transparent. This happens because different constituents will have different demands toward civil society.

Moreover, a transnational civil society has supporters and members coming from various countries and cultures. For example, publishing an NGO's activity report on a website using the English language and its idioms will not be considered as transparency for certain groups of people who do not speak English or do not have access to the Internet (Scholte, 2011: 23). Language preference and technology can be problems in bridging communications between the public and civil society. This condition forces those organisations to have their own criteria be transparent since it is unlikely for them to use a generalised transparency standard.

Another characteristic that should conform to a "standard" of being representative is legitimacy. It has been discussed in previous sections that a state is the only legitimate actor in global governance from the Westphalian perspective. This set cannot be applied to a transnational civil society. The reason is similar to the transparency issue; transnational civil society works all over the world and collaborates with different institutions and governments. Using one particular standard of legitimacy can be problematic for transnational civil society since legitimacy can be seen from different perspectives, and the condition of legitimacy is constructed based on historical, geographical, social, and normative contexts (Hudson, 2001: 341; Collingwood, 2006: 454). Furthermore, setting a global concept of legitimacy will be difficult to accomplish and not a good option for civil society. The absence of global authority and regulation makes the issue of legitimacy in a global sphere complex (Collingwood, 2006: 445). No actors can decide that one particular organisation is legitimate or not.

Different features possessed by state and civil societies lead to a different understanding of accountability, transparency, and legitimacy.

Global civil society will never be seen as an appropriate form of representation if it still sticks to criteria from traditional political representation ideas or the Westphalian framework. It needs to challenge this concept in order to be widely accepted. The next chapter discusses some actions taken by civil society and possible solutions to problems of representativeness, accountability, transparency, and legitimacy.

Solutions for accountability, transparency, and legitimacy of civil society

I have shown some differences between state and civil society related to the representation issue. These two entities see things from different perspectives; nevertheless, they actually have similar functions in global governance regarding representation. States and civil society cannot replace each other since they possess distinct and special roles. Unfortunately, some critics of global civil societies still view them as a threat to the state (Price, 2003: 591). This happens because non-state actors such as civil society are getting more powerful in the globalisation era (Hudson, 2001: 334).

Collingwood (2006: 444) also points out that some civil society organisations nowadays have better engagement with other actors in global governance. They have been actively participating in the global decision-making process. For example, the G20, an international group composed of powerful states and institutions in the economic sector, invites civil society to take part in its activities. They maintain their communication through formal dialogue and discussion pertaining to global economic issues (Transparency International, 2013; G20, n.d.).

Several institutions, such as the G20 and the UN, have realised that the involvement of civil society in their work is very helpful in terms of providing new ideas and solutions. Today, those civil society organisations have transformed into good negotiators and advisors (Rucht, in Martens 2001: 392).

Collaboration between civil society and the G20 addresses some major problems in the global sphere, one being the corruption issue. Transparency International, a global civil society concerned with corruption, has taken a new step in global governance since it was invited to the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group in Moscow in 2013 (Transparency International, n.d.). It works with other civil societies to find effective methods to counter rampant corruption cases in the government sector. Their engagement provides opportunities for civil society to have better access to important information and data. In addition, some groups in society feel represented when civil society is included in global governance activity (Transparency International, n.d.).

Besides their active participation in modern global governance, transnational civil societies also try to overcome their shortcomings. They attempt to answer critics' questions regarding accountability, transparency, and legitimacy aspects through ground-breaking solutions. In terms of accountability, civil society focuses on self-regulation. The establishment of Accountable Commitments as a set of rules ensures that all civil society members have the same concept, standard, and perception regarding accountability. Accountable Commitments help civil societies be better institutions and accountable to the public (Accountable Now, n.d.). In 2016, Accountable Now, a global umbrella for civil society organisations, successfully set a global

standard for CSO accountability, which functions as a measurement of accountability for members within its network (Accountable Now, 2016). This is an easy step for those civil societies to keep their institutions working based on particular criteria, and is one of the most recent responses toward a critique of civil society's accountability.

Advanced technology assists many governments and institutions to be transparent to the public. Jaeger (2007: 257) also mentions that technology can be a potent tool for civil society organisations to represent people's interest in global governance. In regard to transparency, most civil societies already have their own websites and social media accounts, which inform people about their organisation, their activities, and other related information. For example, Greenpeace International, a global civil society focusing on environmental issues, posts the work it does, success stories, and donation opportunities on its website (Greenpeace, n.d.). The public will have better access to civil society once all essential information is available on the Internet. Furthermore, Greenpeace International posts the website links of Greenpeace organisations that work in specific countries or regions of the world. The websites of these regional Greenpeace organisations use the national language of that particular country to help citizens receive information in their own language. It becomes a strategy to overcome language barriers.

Being a legitimate institution is another obstacle for a civil society since it needs to follow a strict standard of Westphalian framework regarding legitimacy. To tackle this problem, it has to use a different strategy. Van Tuijl and Jordan introduced a concept called "political responsibility" as a solution to help civil societies deal with issues of legitimacy, transparency, and accountability (Hudson, 2001:

345). Political responsibility provides an opportunity for civil societies to communicate with other actors in a formal relationship. A civil society works based on its knowledge and expertise, and it also receives fund allocations, which will be easier for the public to access its financial resources. In addition, it will be acknowledged as an official organisation working in collaboration with other actors. This political responsibility method is expected to be one of the ways for civil society to be a proper and legitimate institution in global governance (Hudson, 2001: 348). Meanwhile, Collingwood (2006: 453) argues that, actually, civil society acquires its legitimacy from the state. When a state is “failed” to be legitimate, it is then time for civil society to take critical action. This means that civil society can be legitimate when it is necessary in certain circumstances. Thus, there will be a time and place for civil society to do things in “legitimate” way based on this point of view.

To conclude, different perspectives owned by state and civil society do not mean they cannot collaborate and coordinate to achieve a shared goal. Their differences in understanding aspects of accountability, transparency, and legitimacy should not be a threat to one another. This can be a medium that strengthen their cooperation. Scholte (2011: 11) also makes it clear that global governance needs different actors with distinctive features because global governance works are based on the diversity of the actors. One institution will not be able to deal with all different problems.

CONCLUSION

Civil society emerges as an alternative solution to represent people's voices since government cannot oversee all citizens' interests. Global civil society works across borders and states and becomes one of many actors involved in global governance. It builds coordination and collaboration with other actors, such as state and international institutions, to find possible solutions to world problems. The engagement of civil society in global governance faces some major obstacles. From the perspective of traditional political representation, civil society is not a legitimate representative in the global sphere. This concept of political representation originates from the Westphalian framework, which is used by some academicians to critique positions of civil society within global governance.

The clash of ideas between civil society and the old concept of political representation becomes an interesting discussion here. Civil society's role as a "non-elective representative" challenges the Westphalian framework while proving it is a proper representative of the people through impressive actions done by NGOs such as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. In terms of accountability, transparency, and legitimacy, civil society tries to account for those by setting up new standards and criteria different from traditional ideas of political representation or the Westphalian concept. Moreover, they utilise modern technology as tool to become legitimate and transparent institutions. The Accountable Now organisation also helps civil society solve issues of accountability.

I have shown different ideas and frameworks used by civil society and states to understand and implement the concept of

representativeness, accountability, transparency, and legitimacy. Both have the same purpose in global governance: finding the best solutions for world problems, yet, they offer different approaches. In conclusion, the engagement of civil society in global governance cannot fit into traditional ideas of political representation or the Westphalian framework. Therefore, civil society needs to challenge it through new concepts and definitions of how to be a good societal representative.

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International relations studies have been developing in terms of issues and perspectives. Nevertheless, its scientific roots which were born out of a desire to prevent war and create peace still remain the spirit of the studies. Besides discussing war and conflict, international relations studies also talk about various issues related to global finance, humanitarian assistance, tourism, diaspora and other non-traditional security issues. These various issues also frame the discussion in international relations today, including other aspects that have contributed to discourse related to this field.

This book is a collection of various issues in international relations studies. The authors analyze them using many different methods. This book seeks to show diversity in the study of cross-border relations. Through this diversity, we hope that readers can have wide perspective in analyzing the issue of international relations. Thus, it can be seen as the studies which are able to answer various modern problems. Furthermore, this book is suitable for international relations scholars, both for practitioners and academics, who are interested in getting various insights on how international relations studies analyzing various phenomena. This book is written by lecturers of international relations department based on their area of expertise.



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